Constructing commons in the cultural environment by Madison, MJ et al.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-APR-10 12:24
CONSTRUCTING COMMONS IN THE
CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT*
Michael J. Madison,† Brett M. Frischmann†† &
Katherine J. Strandburg†††
This Article sets out a framework for investigating sharing and re-
source-pooling arrangements for information- and knowledge-based works.
We argue that adapting the approach pioneered by Elinor Ostrom and her
collaborators to commons arrangements in the natural environment provides
a template for examining the construction of commons in the cultural envi-
ronment.  The approach promises to lead to a better understanding of how
participants in commons and pooling arrangements structure their interac-
tions in relation to the environments in which they are embedded, in relation
to information and knowledge resources that they produce and use, and in
relation to one another.
Some examples of the types of arrangements we have in mind are patent
pools (such as the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association), open source
software development projects (such as Linux), Wikipedia, the Associated
Press, certain jamband communities, medieval guilds, and modern research
universities.  These examples are illustrative and far from exhaustive.  Each
involves a constructed cultural commons worthy of independent study, but
independent studies get us only so far.  A more systematic approach is
needed.
An improved understanding of cultural commons is critical for ob-
taining a more complete perspective on intellectual property doctrine and its
interactions with other legal and social mechanisms for governing creativity
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and innovation, in particular, and information and knowledge production,
conservation, and consumption, generally.  We propose an initial framework
for evaluating and comparing the contours of different commons arrange-
ments.  The framework will allow us to develop an inventory of structural
similarities and differences among cultural commons in different industries,
disciplines, and knowledge domains and shed light on the underlying contex-
tual reasons for such differences.  Structured inquiry into a series of case
studies will provide a basis from developing theories to explain the emergence,
form, and stability of the observed variety of cultural commons and, eventu-
ally, to design models to explicate and inform institutional design.
The proposed approach would draw upon case studies from a wide
range of disciplines.  Among other things, we argue that theoretical ap-
proaches to constructed cultural commons should consider rules pertaining to
membership criteria, contribution and use of pooled resources, internal licens-
ing conditions, management of external relationships, and institutional
forms, along with the degree of collaboration among members, sharing of
human capital, degrees of integration among participants, and any specified
purpose to the arrangement.
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INTRODUCTION
The Maine lobster fishery has been recognized as a successful ex-
ample of a managed natural resource commons.  To ensure an ongo-
ing supply of lobster in the face of threats to the fishery from
unregulated overfishing, over a period of years Maine lobster fisher-
men crafted a set of formal and informal rules to determine “who gets
the lobster.”  By design, the product of their efforts is a commons, a
managed-access property regime that allows both lobsters and the lob-
ster industry to flourish.1
This Article confronts the theoretical challenge of understanding
the governance of what we refer to as constructed commons in the
cultural environment, in which the resources to be produced, con-
served, and consumed are not crustaceans but pieces of information:
copyrighted works of authorship, patented inventions, and other
forms of information and knowledge that may, but need not, be al-
igned with formal systems of intellectual property (IP) law.  The
phrase “constructed cultural commons,” as we use it, refers to environ-
ments for developing and distributing cultural and scientific knowl-
edge through institutions that support pooling and sharing that
knowledge in a managed way, much as a natural resource commons
refers to the type of managed sharing environment for natural re-
sources that the Maine lobster fishery represents.  These environ-
ments are designed and managed with limitations tailored to the
character of those resources and the communities involved rather
than left to evolve via market transactions grounded solely in tradi-
tional proprietary rights.  Just as research on the Maine lobster fishery
is grounded in the case study approach used by Elinor Ostrom and
her colleagues, this Article develops and argues for the use of a theo-
retical framework to systematize case study-based research exploring
1 See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS
TO MANAGE THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY (2003) (describing the success of the Maine
lobster industry).
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the construction of the cultural commons.  We borrow from Ostrom
in developing our framework, but we necessarily adapt, extend, and
distinguish her approach to account for important differences be-
tween constructed cultural commons and natural resource commons.
Our approach provides a framework to systematize and unify
analyses of various constructed cultural commons that until now have
been regarded largely as separate species.  We do not claim that all
cultural commons work in exactly the same way or that they all solve
exactly the same problems or that they all produce exactly the same
benefits (or costs).  Our claim is precisely the opposite: by aligning
case studies of related but distinct commons phenomena, over time
we will be able to identify those features of commons that are more
and less significant to the success and failure of a commons enter-
prise.  Aligning the empirical study of constructed cultural commons
via a framework of structured inquiry will facilitate the development of
and choice among theories to explain the existence and structure of
the commons currently in existence and provide insights into the in-
terplay between IP law and commons arrangements.  Some initial il-
lustrations make the point more vivid.
Intellectual property pools.  A patent pool is an agreement by two or
more patent holders to aggregate and share their patents by cross-
licensing.2  The patents in question typically relate to complementary
technologies, where one holder’s exercise of patent rights “blocks” a
different holder’s exercise of related rights.  Pooled patents are typi-
cally available to all members of the pool and are available to non-
members on standard licensing terms.3  A well-known example of an
early patent pool in the United States is the Manufacturer’s Aircraft
Association (MAA), which formed in 1917 and encompassed nearly all
American aircraft manufacturers.4  The Wright Company and Curtiss
Company held major patents on aircraft technology, but Wright and
Curtiss did not hold all the relevant patents, and for any given manu-
facturer the cost of licensing a single needed patent from a competi-
tor might have made manufacturing an airplane prohibitively
expensive.  During World War I, the United States government
needed airplanes at reasonable costs and in a short time.  As a result,
the government facilitated the implementation of the MAA, a private
corporation.  The MAA entered into an agreement with airplane man-
ufacturers, through which the manufacturers pooled their patents
and their potential claims for exploitation of the patents by rivals and
2 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stan-
dard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 127–28, 134 (Adam B. Jaffe et
al. eds., 2000).
3 See id.
4 See id. at 127–28.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq: 5 20-APR-10 12:24
2010] CONSTRUCTING COMMONS 661
agreed to cross-licensing of the patents to one another on what was,
essentially, a royalty-free basis.5  Largely because of this functioning
commons of patented inventions, airplanes were built, and the war
was won.
Open source software.  The Linux operating system, an alternative
to Windows and Mac OS (the Macintosh operating system), was pro-
duced and is still maintained by a volunteer collaborative of individual
programmers.6  The Linux collaborative is linked loosely by communi-
cations technologies, by members’ voluntary allegiance to the project,
and by the terms of an open source license.  Unlike proprietary com-
puter programs, which are distributed to users in object code or exe-
cutable format only, open source programs such as Linux are made
available in source code form so that members of the community may
modify their copies and, under the terms of the governing license,
publish their modifications for use by others.  Members of the com-
munity may also volunteer their modifications for inclusion in the
standard Linux code base.  Thus, each member of the Linux commu-
nity may use material in the Linux commons and may contribute ma-
terial back to the Linux commons.  Each individual member of the
community contributes code to the accumulated archive of the Linux
kernel, which is the core of the operating system.  The rules governing
the use of open source material and contributions to the open source
commons are partly formal and partly informal.  Formally, the
software is governed by copyright law, and its use is managed by the
terms of the General Public License.  Informally, the integrity of
Linux as an identifiable and stable program depends on a thin hierar-
chy of informal authority, which extends from Linus Torvalds at the
top to the body of individual developers at the bottom.7  The result is
a complete, complex, and successful industrial product that is built
and maintained not by a traditional, hierarchical, industrial firm, but
by a loose-knit community.
5 See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 483–87 (1933); Harry
T. Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA), 46 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 646, 648–50 (1964); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1343–46 (1996).
6 Some of these programmers contribute to the Linux project at the behest of their
corporate employers and thus are not volunteers in the strict sense.  They are volunteers
with respect to the Linux project, however.  Their relationship to the Linux community is
governed by the same rules as apply to those who participate for other reasons.  For an
exploration of the governance issues involved in the relationship between open source
software projects and commercial firms, see Siobha´n O’Mahony & Beth A. Bechky, Bound-
ary Organizations: Enabling Collaboration Among Unexpected Allies, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 422, 440
(2008).
7 A recent book thoroughly examines the organizational structure of open source
software projects. See CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
FREE SOFTWARE (2008).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq: 6 20-APR-10 12:24
662 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:657
Wikipedia.  This free, online encyclopedia is widely read and cited.
It resembles an open source software project in many respects.  Volun-
teer authors create and edit Wikipedia entries; anyone with Internet
access can read and use the contents of Wikipedia.8  Wikipedia is not
the product of unregulated, potentially chaotic openness, however.9
A governance structure exists among “Wikipedians” that modulates
the openness of the project and operates as a kind of law.10  For exam-
ple, not all additions and edits to Wikipedia are automatically added
to the site.  Moreover, the GNU Free Documentation License, the
copyright license that governs the contents of Wikipedia, restricts the
use of the contents of the site.11  Wikipedia also has a dispute-resolu-
tion system that plays an important role in sustaining the commons.12
The site is open, but with limits.
The Associated Press.  For more than a century, the Associated Press
(AP) has been the leading American wire service for newspapers.13  It
offers a compelling example of a constructed cultural commons that
is not grounded in formal IP rights.  As factual material, the news itself
cannot be copyrighted (though there is an important but narrow “hot
news misappropriation” tort rule14).  Local newspapers could not af-
ford to cover all of the stories that their readers wanted to read, yet
the ease with which news stories can be appropriated served as a disin-
centive to invest in reporting—a classic free-rider dilemma.  The solu-
tion was a not-for-profit cooperative, owned by the participant news
organizations, which partnered originally with Western Union.15  Co-
8 See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).  For discus-
sions of this and other examples of collective production, see OPEN SOURCES 2.0: THE CON-
TINUING EVOLUTION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2005); Michael J. Madison, Social Software,
Groups, and Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153.
9 In part due to perceptions of Wikipedia as unregulated, open, and chaotic,
Wikipedia presents a puzzle for scholars.  “The most common criticism of Wikipedia over
the years stemmed from simple disbelief: ‘That can’t work.’” CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES
EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 115 (2008).  As David
Hoffman and Salil Mehra note, “Wikipedia is ‘the canonical bee that flies despite scientists’
skepticism that the aerodynamics add up.’”  David A. Hoffman & Salil Mehra, Wikitruth
Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J. 151, 155 (2009) (quoting JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 148 (2008)).
10 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 143–46 (2008). R
11 See Wikipedia: Text of the GNU Free Documentation License, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Wikipedia:Text_of_the_GNU_Free_Documentation_License (last visited Mar. 9,
2010).
12 See Hoffman & Mehra, supra note 9, at 163–75 (examining the Wiki dispute-resolu- R
tion system).
13 See REPORTERS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, BREAKING NEWS: HOW THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS HAS COVERED WAR, PEACE, AND EVERYTHING ELSE 18 (2007).
14 See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–43 (1918); see also Wendy
J. Gordon, Harmless Use: Gleaning from Fields of Copyrighted Works, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2411,
2421–23 (2009) (discussing the structure of the tort doctrine).
15 See Stephen Shmanske, News as a Public Good: Cooperative Ownership, Price Commit-
ments, and the Success of the Associated Press, 60 BUS. HIST. REV. 55, 56–57, 59 n.3 (1986).
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operative members could both upload to the wire service material that
they originated locally and download from the wire service material
that other members produced.16  Local papers were able to carry AP
reports on national and international news that they otherwise could
not have afforded to produce.  The AP itself was a structured com-
mons managed by its members.
Jamband fan communities.  Musical groups known as jambands
“jam,” or improvise heavily, during live performances.  Beginning with
fans of the first and best-known jamband, the Grateful Dead, jamband
fan communities have long been encouraged by the artists themselves
to produce and share their own concert recordings.  These recordings
initially were shared via physical media and now are shared using on-
line archives (organized via the website and organization etree.org).17
The bands encourage this sharing, provided that the fans comply with
informal rules that are set by the bands and honored and policed by
the fan communities themselves.18  For example, as Mark Schultz de-
scribes in his detailed case study of the jamband phenomenon, fan
communities generally undertake not to interfere with commercial ex-
ploitation of the bands’ own concert recordings.19  The commons of
jamband recordings is structured not merely by fan expectations that
norms will be honored but also by file sharing and archiving technolo-
gies that reinforce the commercial/noncommercial distinction, by in-
termediary institutions that host jamband archives, and by the bands,
which cooperate with and nurture their fan communities.20
16 For histories of the AP, see REPORTERS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 13; R
Shmanske, supra note 15; The Associated Press, AP History/Corporate Archives, http:// R
www.ap.org/pages/about/history/history.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).  The thumbnail
sketch presented above necessarily omits important details about the history of the AP,
including allegations that its content was biased politically and that it behaved monopolisti-
cally, as well as information about its current, troubled state.  On its history, see ALEXANDER
JONES, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH: INCLUDING ITS RISE AND PROGRESS
IN THE UNITED STATES (New York, George P. Putnam 1852), and Margaret A. Blanchard,
The Associated Press Antitrust Suit: A Philosophical Clash over Ownership of First Amendment
Rights, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 43 (1987).  On its current struggles, see Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Some
Papers in Financial Trouble Are Leaving the A.P. to Cut Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at B1.
Any accounting of the history of the AP should include its rivalry with United Press and the
International News Service, which merged in the 1950s to form United Press International.
See RICHARD M. HARNETT & BILLY G. FERGUSON, UNIPRESS: COVERING THE 20TH CENTURY
(2003).
17 See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 674, 679 n.116
(2006); see also etree.org, http://www.etree.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
18 See Schultz, supra note 17, at 653, 658. R
19 See id. at 675–76.
20 See id. at 679–80.
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These examples are illustrative of constructed cultural commons
phenomena studied in isolation from each other.21  At first glance,
these examples may appear to be disparate and unrelated—like com-
paring apples to oranges to plums to pears, and so forth.  Standing
alone, each example is important and worth studying.  Nonetheless, a
systematic, comprehensive, and theoretically informed research
framework offers significant potential for learning within and across
these commons phenomena.22
The framework described in this Article provides a means to in-
vestigate the social role and significance of cultural commons institu-
tions.  This investigation is relevant to property law, in particular, and
social ordering, more generally.  The conventional view of property
scholars, particularly those with interests in IP law, is that resource
production and consumption are—and ought to be—characterized
primarily by entitlements to individual resource units, held individu-
ally and allocated via market mechanisms.23  To the extent that those
market mechanisms are inadequate to optimize the welfare of soci-
ety—in other words, in the event of market failure—government in-
tervention may be appropriate.  Intellectual property rights
themselves are generally justified on precisely this basis.24  Creative
works and new inventions are characterized as public goods, whose
intangibility prevents their originators from excluding potential users
and thus recouping their investments via pricing.25  Copyright and
patent laws create artificial but legally sanctioned forms of exclusion,
restoring a measure of market control to creators and innovators.
Communal and collectivist institutions, particularly those that blend
informal normative structures with formal government rules, are gen-
21 To illustrate the potential breadth of the concept of the constructed cultural com-
mons, we note a few additional examples, such as (i) medieval guilds, which provided a
structured environment for sharing expert trade knowledge among members, see Robert
P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institu-
tions, and Innovation 14 (Conference on the Legal History of Intellectual Property, Working
Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543; (ii) the modern research uni-
versity and the departmental and disciplinary structures that lie within it and above it, see
Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as Con-
structed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365 (2009); and (iii) the Request for
Comments (RFCs) series that defines the technical protocols of the Internet, see RFC Edi-
tor Homepage, http://www.rfc-editor.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).  For other historical
examples of technological commons, see Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON.
BEHAV.  & ORG. 1 (1983).
22 See infra Part I.  Likewise, pomology, the study of fruit, offers something more than
studying apples, oranges, plums, and pears independently.
23 See Merges, supra note 21, at 4–7. R
24 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1073 (2005).
25 See id. at 1050–55.
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erally regarded as exceptional and dependent upon preexisting prop-
erty entitlements.26
The framework for collecting and analyzing case studies of con-
structed cultural commons across a wide range of domains that we
describe below offers a method for assessing the validity of this prop-
erty-focused narrative.  We suspect that over time the constructed cul-
tural commons framework will yield a far larger and richer set of
commons cases in the cultural context than one might discover by
focusing only on patent law or scientific research or software develop-
ment.  We anticipate that social ordering both depends on and gener-
ates a wide variety of formal and informal institutional arrangements,
and that the logical and normative priority assigned to proprietary
rights and government intervention may turn out to be misplaced.
Part I of this Article describes prior approaches to theoretical un-
derstanding of intellectual production based on juxtaposition of IP
regimes with a conception of the public domain.  It highlights how
recent case studies demonstrate the need for a more textured theoret-
ical approach.  Part II introduces the Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment framework pioneered by Elinor Ostrom in the natural
resources context and presents our proposed adaptation of the frame-
work to constructed cultural commons.
I
THE BACKDROP:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY,
COMMONS, AND THE NEED FOR A
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
This Part reviews our motivation to produce the constructed cul-
tural commons framework and highlights the key theoretical regimes
to which the framework connects.  We explain why a research frame-
work is needed in this domain and justify the type of framework and
case study-driven approach we develop in Part II.  We begin with a
discussion of IP law and the theoretical problems and solutions that
typically characterize IP regimes.  In particular, we explain the con-
ventional functionalist account of intellectual property, highlight
some of its flaws, and suggest that a more nuanced functional account
is needed to better understand the cultural environment.  Next, we
explain why the functionalist approach of Ostrom and her colleagues,
26 Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and Their Impact
on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 423–28 (2008) [hereinafter Rose, Big
Roads] (emphasizing the idiosyncratic character of “community-based property rights
structures”); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 718–23 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy] (describing “in-
herently public property” in the context of an “exception to the general rule favoring
private property”).
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developed in the context of the natural environment, provides a use-
ful starting point but needs adjustment to account for differences be-
tween the natural environment and the cultural environment.  Finally,
we suggest that narrative and metaphorical accounts of property insti-
tutions and social ordering might complement a functional approach
and enrich the constructed-cultural-commons framework we develop
in Part II.
A. Functionalist Intellectual Property Theory and Its Limits
Intellectual property law scholarship has typically viewed inven-
tion, creative expression, innovation, and related or subsidiary activi-
ties (such as research and development) as a special set of practices
for which extra encouragement is warranted.  Despite considerable va-
riation and nuance, these activities all can be understood to present a
simple core problem: as public goods, the “output” from these activi-
ties—whether described as information, expression, invention, inno-
vation, research, ideas, or otherwise—is naturally nonrivalrous,
meaning that consumption of the resource does not deplete the
amount available to other users, and nonexcludable, meaning that
knowledge resources are not naturally defined by boundaries that per-
mit exclusion of users.27  As a result, such resources
face the well-known supply-side problem, common to public goods:
the inability to (cheaply) exclude competitors and nonpaying con-
sumers (free riders) presents a risk to investors perceived ex ante
(prior to production of the good), and this risk may lead to under-
supply.  Essentially, in the absence of [some institutional solution],
there would be a significant underinvestment in (some types of) [in-
tellectual resources] because of the risk that competitors would ap-
propriate the value of the [resources].28
Two standard solutions to this problem are IP rights and government
subsidies.  These solutions heavily influence the framing and percep-
tion of the cultural environment.
As a result, the conventional functionalist approach to informa-
tion law and policy divides the information environment into two do-
mains.  First, there is the domain of exclusion, in which producers of
27 On the public-good nature of intellectual resources (ideas, information, expres-
sion, and knowledge), see Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 257, 272–73 (2007).  On how those resources generate different types of externali-
ties, see Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 301, 310–21; Frischmann & Lemley, supra, at 258–61.  On public goods and externalities
generally, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 40–43 (2d ed. 1996) (describing externalities as the absence of
markets and the effect of externalities on property rights).
28 Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143, 2156 (2009)
(footnote omitted).
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creative and innovative things employ proprietary rights sanctioned by
law to control their development, distribution, and exploitation.  Pri-
vate rights and private market exchange serve to limit, by law, the nat-
ural shareability of knowledge and innovation.  At the core of IP law,
as traditionally conceived, is the right to exclude, without which it is
assumed that some producers would abandon their efforts for fear of
free riding (unlicensed sharing) by competitors.29  Without exclusion,
competition facilitated by sharing would undermine incentives to in-
vest in the production, development and/or dissemination of some
resources in the first place.  Intellectual property law constructs and
assigns these exclusive rights and encourages their exploitation
through market exchange.
Second, there is the public domain, a vast collection of openly
accessible resources for which exclusion is disallowed under existing
intellectual property systems (for example, due to express exclusion
from the system30 or expiration of rights31) or not practiced (for ex-
ample, because potential owners dedicate their resources to the pub-
lic or because exclusion is practically impossible).32  For some types of
resources, overconsumption and underinvestment problems associ-
ated with unlicensed sharing are solved through direct or indirect
provisioning by the public sector using a combination of grants to re-
searchers; tax credits or subsidies to researchers and enterprises that
employ them; prizes; and production and distribution of knowledge
and innovation by the government itself, either by organizing re-
search enterprises or by purchasing and distributing private research.
These alternative solutions often, though not always, supply resources
to the public domain.33
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107 (2006) (providing for limits on the scope of copy-
rightable subject matter and for the fair use defense); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2006)
(providing for limits on the scope of patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas are not patentable); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 147–66, 302–10 (2003) (discussing limits on
copyright and patent); Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at 284–93 (same). R
31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“limited times”); 17 U.S.C. § 302 (establishing the
duration of a copyright); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (establishing the duration of a patent).
32 See Pamela Samuelson, Lecture, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J.
783, 816–28 (2006) (exploring dedication to the public domain).
33 Consider, for example, university patenting of federally funded research. See, e.g.,
CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE: NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA (Henry
Etzkowitz et al. eds., 1998); INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (Lewis M. Branscomb et al. eds., 1999); Ajay Agrawal, Univer-
sity-to-Industry Knowledge Transfer: Literature Review and Unanswered Questions, 3 INT’L J.
MGMT. REV. 285 (2001); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in
the Cause of Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 171 (Roger G.
Noll ed., 1998); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:  Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996); J.H.
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The conventional functionalist paradigm is woefully inadequate
as a descriptive matter.34  Essentially, it is a caricature—an oversimpli-
fied account that roughly describes some cultural practices and pro-
ductive activities but leaves much too much out of frame,
unexamined, and unaccounted for.  (Consider, for a moment, how
many creative and inventive activities involve much more than “public
goods production” or how often participation in such activities is
outside of and inexplicable in terms of IP incentives or government
subsidies.)  We further explain this view below, but first we must em-
phasize how much rests on the descriptive account: it shapes—if not
determines—the set of baseline premises that undergird the legal and
social institutions that structure the cultural environment and shape
normative outcomes.  Although our undertaking is emphatically posi-
tive and descriptive, we believe significant normative implications
should flow from a better understanding of the cultural
environment.35
Over the last decade, scholars increasingly have recognized that
many of the most interesting and important aspects of the informa-
tion environment exist in the area between these private and public
extremes precisely because of what Brett Frischmann and Mark Lem-
ley characterize as “spillovers”: social benefits that flow from uses and
reuses of information resources and sustain the dynamic character of
the information environment.36  The information environment is rid-
dled with so-called “semicommons”37—complex combinations of pri-
vate rights and commons, some of which are constructed at the
“macro, system level” of law,38 and some of which are constructed at
the “micro, contextual level” of cultural commons.
At the macro level, the rights of exclusion that comprise the de-
fault regimes of patent and copyright law are, by design, not absolute.
Intellectual property regimes moderate their exclusionary principles
with limitations and exceptions.  In part, those limitations and excep-
tions are designed to construct a public domain of resources that are
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in
a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003).
34 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1155–62 (2007).
35 See Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and The Wealth of Networks, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1084–85 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NET-
WORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006)).
36 See Frischmann, supra note 27, at 310–21; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at R
268–71, 282–84.
37 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).  Henry Smith gives the example of a highway, which is a com-
mons in that its most significant aspect is its openness to all users—yet the individual driver
has private rights with respect to the moving portion that his vehicle occupies. Id. at 132.
38 Frischmann and Lemley explain how copyright and patent law are semicommons.
See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at 282, 284–85, 290–91. R
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\95-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-APR-10 12:24
2010] CONSTRUCTING COMMONS 669
open and freely available to all,39 and in part, they support public ca-
pabilities to use resources in ways that generate spillovers.40
In addition to these macro-constructions, intellectual property
rules also are used at a micro-level, in conjunction with contracts and
social norms, to construct a wide variety of semicommons or limited
commons of cultural resources that are partly open and partly closed,
usable by members and sometimes by the public at large, though not
always on a purely “free” basis. Examples include such diverse institu-
tions as public lending libraries and open source software programs.
Default rules of intellectual property thus may be combined with li-
censes and contracts, with social norms, and with cultural and other
institutional forms to construct these cultural commons, which de-
pend on—but are built alongside and on top of—the basic forms of
knowledge and culture, on the one hand, and intellectual property
rules, on the other hand.
B. Commons in Culture and the Need for a Research
Framework
Our focus on constructed cultural commons emerges from the
proposition that cultural production is an inherently social phenome-
non, taking place over a wide range of scales and within a complex,
overlapping variety of formal and informal institutional structures.41
Indeed, social production of cultural goods has become more salient
and more economically important as a result of globalization and the
communications revolution symbolized by the Internet.42  We are thus
beginning to grapple with the realization that legal facilitation of in-
novation and creative production is not—and cannot—be confined to
a simple set of property rules to incentivize individual innovative and
creative efforts.  Innovation and creativity are matters of governance
of a highly social cultural environment.  The question for both public
policy and legal theory becomes how best to use legal and other tools
39 On the public domain, see generally Samuelson, supra note 32 (exploring various R
conceptions of the public domain).
40 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at 286–88 (explaining fair use in these R
terms); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 409 (2005) (“Fair use is fair, after all, because (we assume) that it
generates social benefits that the market can’t otherwise produce.”).
41 Cultural works and information goods have always been socially constructed in
many senses, meaning that they do not arise “naturally” or inevitably but, instead, are the
products of human actions and interactions with each other, social institutions and sys-
tems, and the physical environment.  The traditional, economically inspired realm of pro-
duction around which intellectual property protection is designed cannot be treated as
independent of the larger cultural environment within which it is situated.  On the legal
construction of cultural things, see Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and
Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 447–63 (2005).
42 See BENKLER, supra note 35, at 466–67 (2006); Frischmann, supra note 35, at R
1107–10 (reviewing BENKLER, supra note 35). R
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to encourage the growth and persistence of creative, sustainable, and
equitable cultural environments.43
Much of the scholarly debate in IP law has pitted proponents of
privatization as a means of incentivizing production of intellectual
goods against proponents of a widely available public domain upon
which cultural goods can be built.  The discussion has often devolved
into a disagreement over the relative importance of incentives and
access for production of ideas and creative expression.44  As technol-
ogy has evolved to facilitate an increasingly extensive, varied land-
scape of social and cooperative projects that enable creativity and
innovation, a third perspective has emerged.  Books, articles, and
scholarly discussion of such projects, of which open source software
has become the poster child, increasingly extol community produc-
tion as a solution to the free-rider problems of cultural production.45
The danger is that the amorphous idea of “community production”
will become the new one-size-fits-all panacea approach in rivalry with
privatization, public subsidy, and the public domain.
Fortunately, ours is not the first scholarly enterprise to confront
the realization that common-property regimes are more complex and
various than had been appreciated.  A group of scholars of commons
regimes in the natural environment, spearheaded by Ostrom and her
collaborators, has eschewed a simplistic approach and developed a
framework for synthesizing studies of various and diverse natural re-
source commons.  We argue that now is the time to recognize that the
lessons learned by these scholars of the natural environment caution
against an overly simplistic view of community cultural production.46
The primary lesson of their years of case studies of commons regimes,
which culminated in Ostrom receiving the 2009 Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics,47 is that the devil is in the details.  Complex environments
43 We use the term “cultural environment” advisedly, following the work of James
Boyle. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87, 108–12 (1997).  The environmental metaphor should not lead scholars to rely un-
critically on the assumption that there is anything “natural” about the cultural environ-
ment.  As we discuss, one of the most important differences between natural resource
commons and cultural commons is the degree to which cultural resources are manufac-
tured, both by humans and by law.  Natural resources, typically, are given.  Yet we also
caution against going too far in the other direction.  Although the natural environment is
given and not made by humans, it is continuously and unavoidably affected by humans
and, in a sense, made and remade and unmade with irreversible consequences through
those interactions.  And although the cultural environment is always made by humans, it is
also inherited, subject to considerable path dependencies that can have irreversible conse-
quences, and contingent on human interactions with the physical environment.
44 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30, at 11–12. R
45 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 35, at 36–37; SHIRKY, supra note 9, at 240–53. R
46 Cf. Elinor Ostrom et al., Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
15176 (2007) (arguing against oversimplification and reflexive appeal of panaceas).
47 Professor Ostrom’s citation in connection with her recent receipt of the 2009
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences focuses on “her analysis of economic govern-
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demand a more contextual empirical and theoretical approach.48
The complexity of natural and cultural environments and the futility
of analyzing them with one-size-fits-all theories or legal approaches
create the challenge of developing appropriate conceptual under-
standing and policy prescriptions.  Here is where and why we think
that an adaptation of Ostrom’s approach to the systematized study of
natural resource commons may be particularly helpful for intellectual
property scholarship.
As we describe in detail in Part II.A, Ostrom’s approach repre-
sents a starting point, but one that requires significant modifications.
Those modifications, discussed in Part II.B, are woven into the baskets
of questions we propose to use to interrogate constructed cultural
commons.  Those baskets of questions reflect an intentional reliance
on two approaches to intellectual property that are sometimes
thought to conflict: a functionalist account and a metaphorical or nar-
rative approach.
The functionalist aspect of our proposed framework mirrors the
functionalist approach that Ostrom and her colleagues take with re-
spect to regimes governing the sharing and exploitation of natural
resources.  Despite the many virtues of functionalist accounts, their
focus on a handful of variables or factors often limits them.  A focus
on excludability as a solution to public goods problems can lead to
isolated analysis of boundary problems.49  A focus on appropriability
mechanisms may lead to narrow analysis of resource definition issues.
A focus on transaction costs may lead to myopic consideration of in-
ance, especially the commons.”  The Nobel Foundation, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/economics/laureates/2009/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
48 Our point coincides well with J.B. Ruhl’s work on the uses of complexity theory in
environmental regulation. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERS-
ITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 335–61 (2d ed. 2006); J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 18–20 (2007); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 867–73 (1996).
49 In a recent article, Frischmann argued that a myopic focus on excludability leads to
biased analyses:
[P]ossible free riding drives analysts to focus on supply-side considerations,
and more specifically, to correct market-driven supply problems by design-
ing property-based institutions to lessen the costs of exclusion and mini-
mize free riding.  As I have argued elsewhere, nonexcludability is not a
necessary condition for market failure; markets may fail for many other rea-
sons.  Nor, however, does exclusion fix all market failures.  In fact, exclu-
sion may aggravate other failures of the market.  Even if an owner can
exclude users from a nonrival resource and therefore meter use by charg-
ing a fee, dynamic inefficiencies still may abound.  Simply put, property
rights and other institutions that lessen the costs of exclusion and facilitate
market-driven provision of nonrival goods are no panacea.
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89
MINN. L. REV. 917, 948–49 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
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formation-forcing and limiting mechanisms.  Such approaches can ef-
fectively highlight strengths and weaknesses of policy prescriptions in
their respective domains, but these approaches frequently fail to deal
adequately with systemic issues or with dynamic changes.  Ostrom’s
approach to natural resource commons addresses the limitations of
functionalism by expanding the number of variables considered.
In the context of the cultural environment, the sharing/exclu-
sion and cooperation/competition dichotomies present especially in-
teresting and challenging puzzles to a functionalist approach.  This is
so for three reasons.
First, those who create, invent, innovate, and participate in simi-
lar intellectually driven, productive activities necessarily borrow from
or share with others.50  It is impossible to divest oneself of that to
which one has been exposed.  Inevitably, the intellectual products of
past and contemporary “producers” (a term that we use as a short-
hand to refer to creators, inventors, innovators, thinkers, and the like)
serve as inputs into each of our own productive activities.  We necessa-
rily borrow and share.  Second, as discussed above, the resources that
shape the cultural environment are by their nature naturally
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, meaning that knowledge resources
are not naturally defined by boundaries that permit exclusion of
users.51  Third, unlike resources in the natural world, resources of in-
formation and expression must be created before they can be shared.
Because of the public goods character of these resources, a cultural
commons must manage both use and production of cultural
resources.
These features of cultural resources, practices, and environment
add to the range of variables that must be considered when studying
commons institutions.  Moreover, although natural resource manage-
ment often focuses on sustainability, in the cultural commons the goal
generally goes beyond sustainability to innovation, growth, and pro-
gress.52  This shift in focus means that in assessing any particular con-
structed-cultural-commons arrangement, we must expand the
50 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at 258–61. R
51 On the point that these resources have no natural boundaries and that, as a result,
boundaries are necessarily constructed, see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at 274; R
Madison, supra note 41, at 401–04. R
52 Progress in the cultural environment should not be equated with innovation or
economic growth.  Progress may encompass much more. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern
“Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 101–03 (1993)
(arguing that the definition of “progress” is socially constructed and should be shaped by
social values and human priorities); Frischmann, supra note 35, at 1095–96 (arguing that R
“we know too little about that which we seek to promote” with intellectual property, that
the functionalist approach to intellectual property follows from an impoverished view of
the cultural environment, and that “[w]e might, for example, imagine Progress as mea-
sured by the degree of participation in creative and inventive activities”).
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framework used in studying natural resources to consider not only
how resources are managed and shared within the community but
also how and if resources are created within and transferred outside of the
community.  Dynamic effects are central to this analysis.  The con-
structed-cultural-commons framework we propose in Part II reflects
these functionalist distinctions between Ostrom’s approach to natural
resource commons and our modified approach to intellectual-re-
source institutions.
A second and equally important way to address the limitations of
functionalist theory in the cultural commons context is to examine a
system of social ordering in expressive terms rather than purely func-
tional terms, looking to the construction and evolution of meaning in
the system, as reflected in symbol and narrative.  In proper propor-
tion, a humanistic and metaphorical inquiry into information policy,
on one hand, and a functional approach grounded in social science
models, on the other hand, are complementary and can be effectively
unified in a framework of research questions to yield accurate descrip-
tive summaries of commons phenomena and eventual policy
prescriptions.
We draw on narrative and metaphorical approaches to legal and
sociological questions, specifically by examining the metaphorical
dimensions of the information “environment” and the knowledge
“commons.”53  The environmental metaphor for information law and
53 Scholars of many stripes have focused increased attention over the last decade on
the role of language and metaphor in structuring analysis of legal and policy problems,
both in connection with IP law and otherwise.  For a recent review of the Law and Litera-
ture movement, see Bernadette Meyler, The Myth of Law and Literature, 8 LEGAL ETHICS 318
(2005) (reviewing THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYS-
TEM FAILS TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT (2004)) (suggesting that Law and Literature should focus
on the role of literature in understanding the institutions of law).  Other scholars have
emphasized connections between language and metaphor, on the one hand, and cognitive
processes that drive behavior and experience, on the other hand. See GEORGE LAKOFF &
MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3–6 (1980).  James Boyle focuses on the rhetoric of
authorship and invention metaphors in order to expose the political character of property
law. See Boyle, supra note 43, at 87–91.  Carol Rose focuses on narratives of property law to R
demonstrate the essentially social character of the law. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 35–42 (1994).
A number of intellectual property scholars draw on environmental and spatial metaphors
in their discussions of information law and policy. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 35, at R
1084–85, 1088–97 (reviewing the use of cultural environmentalism as a metaphor in infor-
mation policy discussions and arguing that, to be analytically useful, “we need to know
more about what the cultural environment is, how it works, how it is constructed, how we
interact with it, how we change it, how we are a part of it, and how it relates and interacts
with other environments”); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147, 158–59 (1981) (“[T]he law of trademarks . . . has begun to spill over its bound-
aries and encroach into territories in which trademark protection amounts to trespass.”);
Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1025, 1029 (1998) (discussing “open space”); Samuelson, supra note 32, at 804–05 R
(describing the public domain).
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policy—focusing on cultural and knowledge resources rather than
physical or natural resources—offers an especially illuminating and
useful starting point for our project.  Relying on this metaphor offers
the ability to explore connections within and between interconnected
and interdependent natural and constructed resource systems; to dif-
ferentiate growth and progress from stewardship, conservation, and
sustainability; to describe the differences between natural and con-
structed environments and the differences between open and closed
or “gated” or “managed” environments; to describe different versions
of concepts based on adjacent metaphors, such as the public domain
and the commons; to identify and describe important patterned be-
haviors that correspond to different kinds of environments; and to
draw lessons from a variety of regulatory and governance structures in
other environmental contexts (public and private, legislative and ad-
ministrative, oriented toward individual entitlements and collectivist,
and so forth).
The environmental metaphor also illuminates the importance of
the nesting process that Ostrom identifies as a salient feature of com-
mons.54  By “nesting,” we mean that a particular commons phenome-
non might be analyzed at many levels; these levels may interact
strongly with one another.  One of the issues that must be resolved in
any particular inquiry is the appropriate level of complexity at which a
particular commons should be studied.  Ostrom analogizes this nested
analysis to a set of maps at different levels of detail,55 such as one sees
when using the zoom function in Google Maps.56  All of these maps
are accurate, but the usefulness of a particular map depends on the
question one seeks to answer.  Moreover, some questions can be an-
swered by focusing only at street level, while others may require zoom-
ing back and forth to different levels.  Similarly, analyzing a commons
institution may require more or less detailed knowledge of the larger
cultural institutions within which it resides.
This Article begins to explore how this nesting process can and
should be examined in the cultural context.  Our combined function-
alist and expressive framework is deliberately intended for application
to the cultural commons in environments that are structured not only
by IP law but also by other legal rules, such as the rules of contract and
license, and by informal cultural institutions and social practices.  A
structured inquiry is needed to make progress in understanding the
complex and diverse commons arrangements that may be constructed
in the cultural environment.
54 ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 58–62 (2005).
55 Id. at 8.
56 See Google Maps, http://maps.google.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
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II
DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF COMMONS IN
THE CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
This Part sets out our proposed framework for analyzing con-
structed cultural commons using a case study approach.
A. Learning and Building from Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis
and Development Framework
As discussed above, we base our proposed framework on the work
of the political scientist Ostrom and her colleagues, who have for de-
cades been studying commons in the natural resource environment.57
Examples include not only the lobster fishery with which we began the
Article but also numerous instances of grazing pastures, forests, and
irrigation systems.58  In each case, a similar underlying problem was
diagnosed: what property scholars, following Garrett Hardin, refer to
as a “tragedy of the commons.”59  Given a pool of physical resources
that is presumptively open to all comers, such as a meadow for grazing
sheep, and absent a mechanism for coordinating the actions of re-
source users, that is, the owners of the sheep, resources are likely to be
overconsumed and underproduced.60  Eventually, the pool will col-
lapse under the weight of individuals acting rationally in pursuit of
their own self-interest, without regard for the costs imposed on other
existing and future resource users.  The tragedy of the commons illus-
trates a standard externality problem that manifests a failure of collec-
tive action.61
This argument is often coupled with an argument that such
“tragic” situations give rise to solutions grounded in regimes of exclu-
sionary property rights.62  The leading alternative to privatization and
57 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 15181, 15181 (2007) (studying the problems of overuse or destruc-
tion of resources in social-ecological systems).
58 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58–88 (1990) (describing commons case studies).
59 E.g., Rose, Big Roads, supra note 26, at 411; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the R
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
60 See Hardin, supra note 59, at 1244. R
61 The tragedy of the commons can be explained in terms of externalities, as a collec-
tive-action problem, or in game-theory terms as a prisoners’ dilemma. See, e.g., Wayne East-
man, Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Coase Theorem,
and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 727, 749–51 (1997) (describing the trag-
edy of the commons as a “multi-person Dilemma”).
62 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348
(1967); Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. &
ECON. 649, 660 (2007); Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of “Toward a Theory of Property
Rights,” 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127–28 (2008); see also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43–44 (1960) (adding well-defined property rights to the menu of options
for dealing with externalities).
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allocation of property rights via markets is government intervention
and regulation.63  A key insight of Ostrom’s approach to the natural
environment was recognition of the important role for institutions in-
termediate between private property and the state in solving problems
of collective action.64  These intermediate institutions are sometimes
called “common property” or “limited commons” and generally are
collective (but not necessarily governmental or even formal) means
for sharing and making productive and sustainable use of resources
such as fish, water, trees, and so forth.65  The research of Ostrom and
other scholars demonstrates that solutions to these resource-sharing
problems are various and highly contextual.  Standard theoretic mod-
els, whether or not grounded in the presumption that a tragedy of the
commons is present, can therefore be only the beginning of a much
more complex analysis.  The temptation to seek out regulatory pan-
aceas based on universal models, whether through private property,
state action, or even notions of community, must be resisted in favor
of a more nuanced approach.66
In response to the inadequacy of one-size-fits-all approaches, Os-
trom’s method for systematizing the investigation of commons re-
gimes focuses on the nested, multitier character of the natural
resource commons.67  Her Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework is used to structure a common set of research ques-
tions to apply in diverse contexts, with the eventual goal of coming to
some conclusions about the significance and interactions of various
factors in facilitating effective management of common resources.68
Our objective is to do the same in the cultural context.
To implement the IAD framework, Ostrom and her collaborators
employed a three-pronged approach:
• First, they engaged in a broad range of case studies of natural
resource commons to form a basis for a bottom-up practice-based
taxonomy of successful and unsuccessful approaches to resource
management.
• Second, they developed a framework, based on the initial case
studies, for identifying the variables that are significant in deter-
63 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 27, at 68, 72–78; ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECO- R
NOMICS OF WELFARE 29–30 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1952).
64 See OSTROM, supra note 58, at 103. R
65 See id. at 88–90.
66 See generally Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge
Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 41
(Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007) (describing relevance of Institutional Analysis
and Development framework to studies of knowledge and information commons); Ostrom
et al., supra note 46. R
67 See Ostrom et al., supra note 46. R
68 See Ostrom, supra note 57, at 15181–82. R
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mining the success or failure of a commons enterprise and of the
viability of institutions in particular contexts.
• Third, they preserved flexibility in their framework so that it
could be adapted and revised in response to learning derived
from the case studies.69
Based on the information obtained by applying their framework to
structured case studies, they developed theories and models for partic-
ular commons situations, designed experiments to test those theories,
and advanced a set of design principles for successful natural resource
commons.70
The framework approach recognizes the crucial importance of
the interplay between the characteristics of a commons resource and
the social, political, economic, and institutional arrangements for its
governance in which it is embedded.71  This approach also walks the
difficult line between overly simplistic theoretical models, which pa-
per over important complexities, and a fragmented taxonomy of di-
verse situations.  As Ostrom explains, frameworks, theories, and
models have different roles to play:
The development and use of a general framework helps to
identify the elements (and the relationships among these ele-
ments) that one needs to consider for institutional analysis.
Frameworks . . . provide the most general set of variables that
should be used to analyze all types of settings relevant for the frame-
work. . . .  They attempt to identify the universal elements that any
relevant theory would need to include. . . .
The development and use of theories enable the analyst to spec-
ify which components of a framework are relevant for certain kinds
of questions and to make broad working assumptions about these
elements.  Thus, theories focus on parts of a framework and make
specific assumptions that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a
phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict outcomes. . . .
Microeconomic theory, game theory, transaction cost theory, social
choice theory, public choice, constitutional and covenantal theory,
and theories of public goods and common-pool resources are all
compatible with the IAD framework discussed in this book.
The development and use of models make precise assumptions
about a limited set of parameters and variables.  Logic, mathemat-
ics, game theory models, experimentation and simulation, and
other means are used to explore the consequences of these assump-
tions systematically on a limited set of outcomes.  Multiple models
are compatible with most theories. . . .
69 See id.
70 See COMM. ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS passim (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002); OSTROM, supra
note 54; OSTROM, supra note 58. R
71 See Ostrom, supra note 57, at 15182–83. R
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. . . .
. . . .  One needs a common framework and family of theories
in order to address questions of reforms and transitions.  Particular
models then help the analyst to deduce specific predictions about
likely outcomes of highly simplified structures.  Models are useful in
policy analysis when they are well-tailored to the particular problem
at hand.  Models are used inappropriately when applied to the study
of problematic situations that do not closely fit the assumptions of
the model . . . .72
In the cultural environment context, the need for a framework to
systematize theoretical and empirical research is readily apparent.
The conventional functionalist explanation of public goods leads to a
rather constrained set of theories and models and a consequently con-
strained set of prescriptions and knowledge.  The theories and models
work well for some observed phenomena but not for many other phe-
nomena.  Yet identifying or developing other relevant theories or
models (or even knowing when to look outside the proverbial box)
can be difficult.73  A framework can help researchers to develop and
choose among different theories.  For example, club theory may be
helpful in understanding the dynamics of patent pools but poorly
suited to understanding Wikipedia.  Patent pools are less open in
terms of membership, and they manage shared resources in a fashion
that is much less focused on sustaining joint production.  Wikipedia,
by contrast, is quite open in terms of membership, contributions, and
participation in various aspects of the project largely because it fo-
cuses on sustaining joint production.  Consequently, club theory is not
likely to be particularly helpful for a researcher studying Wikipedia.
Other theories of cooperation might be better suited to the task.  A
research framework such as ours aims to systematize the investigation,
facilitate a more rigorous evaluation by matching and testing of theo-
ries and models with observed phenomena, and, most generally, en-
able learning over time.  By design, the IAD framework remains a
work in progress in the natural resource domain,74 which is one of its
strengths.  We follow that tradition.
The IAD framework for natural resource commons is illustrated
in Figure 1.75  It divides the investigation of a commons regime into a
set of inquiries into groups of underlying factors.  The first group,
including biophysical characteristics, community attributes, and what
Ostrom and her collaborators denote “rules-in-use,” or governance
72 OSTROM, supra note 54, at 28–29. R
73 Recent study of peer production in online environments provides a promising ex-
ample of efforts to move beyond the conventional set of theories. See supra notes 9, 35, 42, R
and accompanying text.
74 Ostrom, supra note 57, at 15186. R
75 This illustration is modeled on Ostrom & Hess, supra note 66, at 44 fig. 3.1. R
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mechanisms, are denoted by Ostrom as “exogenous variables.”  These
attributes of a particular commons are fixed, at least with respect to
the analysis of a particular situation.76  In the case of the lobster fish-
ery, for example, these attributes might include the relevant biological
characteristics of lobsters, such as the rates at which they age and
reproduce; attributes of the community of fishermen, such as the
proximity in which they live to others, the existence of  familial rela-
tionships, and the skill sets needed for lobster fishing; and the rules—
explicit or informal—that govern fishing.77  The second group fo-
cuses on what Ostrom calls the “action arena.”  An action arena “re-
fers to the social space where participants with diverse preferences
interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one
another, or fight (among the many things that individuals do in ac-
tion arenas)”78—in other words, the place at which the exogenous
variables combine in particular instances, leading over time to ob-
served patterns of interactions and outcomes.
Ostrom’s work emphasizes the diversity of possible combinations
of exogenous variables that determine what actually happens in partic-
ular instances and, hence, the outcomes that result.79  The rules gov-
erning lobster fishing contribute to the activity’s long-term
sustainability, for example, but the patterns of interaction actually ob-
served depend on the richness of the particular environment for lob-
sters, the degree to which rules are actually enforced, seasonal factors
such as weather, and interaction with outside influences such as pollu-
tion80 and the state of the larger economy.81  Understanding the ob-
served success or failure of a commons enterprise such as a lobster
fishery may require accounting for all of these factors, even though it
may turn out that outcomes are relatively impervious to some of them.
A simple illustration of the framework might be a soccer league.
The formal rules of soccer are fixed, but the rules-in-use clearly vary
somewhat between a professional league and a recreational league,
between a children’s league and an adult league, and so forth.  A spe-
cific soccer league is also characterized by the relationships among the
players (whether neighbors, professional competitors, or friends), by
the attributes of the fields on which games are played, and even by the
76 Of course, as Ostrom herself recognizes, variables that are treated as exogenous or
fixed for the analysis of a particular institution (laws relating to a fishery, for example) may
be the outcomes of another (a legislature, for example). See OSTROM, supra note 54, at 13. R
77 See Ostrom, supra note 57, at 15184–85. R
78 See OSTROM, supra note 54, at 14. R
79 See Ostrom, supra note 57, at 15181. R
80 See id. at 15184–85.
81 See Abby Goodnough, Seeking Salve for the Wound of an Ailing Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2009, at A16 (describing conflicts among fishermen arising from the recent eco-
nomic crisis).
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climate of the places where the games take place.  The action arena—
soccer games—depends on complex and specific interactions among
all of these characteristics.  Nonetheless, the outcomes over time in a
particular league are the patterns of interaction that are clearly identi-
fiable as “professional soccer,” “friendly weekend game,” “children’s
soccer league,” and the like.  Moreover, some leagues will be success-
ful, lasting for years even as players come and go, while others will fail.
The goal of applying the Ostrom framework of analysis in this context
would be to use studies and analysis of many different soccer leagues
to come to an understanding of success and failure as a function of
specific context.
Biophysical
Characteristics
Attributes of the
Community
Rules-in-Use
Actors
Action Situations
ACTION ARENA
Patterns of
Interactions
Evaluative
Criteria
Outcomes
Figure 182
The foundation of the Ostrom analysis is asking related questions
in clusters about the exogenous variables, the action arena, and the
patterns of interactions and outcomes.83  Questions about the bio-
physical characteristics, attributes of the community, and rules-in-use,
for example, include the following:
• What boundaries define the resource pool?  What is the source of
supply and sustainability of the resource units?  Under what con-
ditions may resource units be appropriated from the pool?
• How does the population monitor and enforce rules regarding
contribution and appropriation?  What sorts of sanctions are
available, and what sanctions are actually used?  What conflict-res-
olution mechanisms are in place?
• If the community relies on other populations in some respects, or
if the population delegates some functions to subsidiary popula-
tions, what is the character of these relationships?
• In all instances, to what extent are these attributes inscribed in
formal institutions of the state?  To what extent are they inscribed
in other formal, legal institutions, and to what extent are they
inscribed in social norms or other social or cultural structures?
82 See OSTROM, supra note 54, at 15. R
83 See id. at 13–14.
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We think that the IAD concept has proven sufficiently fruitful to
make it worth adapting for our purposes.84  The nested, multi-tiered
character of sustainable cultural environments and the diversity of at-
tributes that contribute to successful governance regimes are keys to
understanding cultural commons as mechanisms for knowledge pro-
duction, collection, and distribution in the context of modern infor-
mation and IP law regimes.
Ostrom and her colleagues have taken preliminary steps toward
understanding how these methods might be relevant to investigating
certain cultural commons.85  Ostrom and Hess have analyzed the
management of digital collections of existing knowledge resources, an
admirable first step that signals the need for and plausibility of ex-
tending the IAD framework to the cultural environment.86  As our dis-
cussion of the categories of questions below reveals, we argue that the
IAD framework must be extended to account adequately for the wide
variety of constructed commons in the cultural environment.87
Most importantly, unlike commons in the natural resource envi-
ronment, cultural commons arrangements usually must create a gov-
ernance structure within which participants not only share existing
resources but also engage in producing those resources.88  This charac-
teristic of cultural commons produces a more intertwined set of exog-
enous variables because separating the managed resources from the
attributes and rules-in-use of the community that produces them is
impossible.  Cultural commons are also nested within and interact with
more complex systems of natural and socially constructed
environments.
To see the point, consider a copyright or patent pool, such as the
MAA described in the Introduction, to which IP rights holders agree
to contribute patents or copyrights that those same holders may ex-
ploit on standardized terms specified as part of the construction of the
pool.89  This arrangement creates an environment for pool members
that facilitates sharing and use internally and interacts simultaneously
with the external environment and shapes relationships with non-
members.  In other words, patent and copyright laws construct partic-
ular environments with default boundaries governing access to and
84 See, e.g., Commons Sense, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, at 76 (paying tribute to the com-
mons research of Ostrom and her colleagues and emphasizing the need for a study of “new
commons” of the sort we focus on here).
85 See Ostrom & Hess, supra note 66. R
86 See id. at 54–59.
87 Frischmann presented an earlier draft of this paper at the 12th Biennial Confer-
ence of the International Association for the Study of Commons in 2008, and this was a
topic of extensive discussion.
88 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 21, at 368–69. R
89 See Dykman, supra note 5, at 648–51. R
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use of certain forms of knowledge.  Commons arrangements
grounded in those laws involve contextually specific deviations from
the default given by IP law.  These constructed cultural commons may
lead to creativity, innovation, and improvement that would not be at-
tainable either in the so-called “natural” state of information without
intellectual property protection or in the state of information with
“full” intellectual property protection.
Our proposed modified framework for constructed cultural com-
mons, which reflects the iterative and constructed character of the
commons community, its cultural resources, and its governing “rules-
in-use,” is illustrated in Figure 2.  Figure 2 differs from Figure 1 in that
it illustrates the interactions among and constructed nature of the cul-
tural resources themselves.
Resource
Characteristics
Attributes of the
Community
Rules-in-Use
Actors
Action Situations
ACTION ARENA
Patterns of
Interactions
Evaluative
Criteria
Figure 2
Figure 2 also reflects a second modification to Ostrom’s IAD
framework, the collapse of the distinction between outcomes and
“patterns of interaction” that results from the intersection between
the commons “action arena” and community attributes, resource at-
tributes, and rules-in-use.  We argue that given the role of both formal
law and informal rule systems in commons governance, these patterns
of interactions are inseparable from the outcomes of commons sys-
tems.  How people interact with rules, resources, and each other, in
other words, is itself an outcome that is inextricably linked with the
form and content of the knowledge or informational output of the
commons.  In an open source software project, for example, the exis-
tence and operation of the open source development collaborative,
the identity of the dynamic thing called the open source software pro-
gram, and the existence and operation of the relevant open source
software license are constitutive of one another.90  Because of the
90 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that
violations of an open source software license can be remedied by injunction, in order to
preserve the productive character of the open source community).
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more complex relationships among resources, participants, and gov-
ernance structures in cultural commons, relevant attributes may not
divide as neatly into categories as they do when one is describing a
pooling of natural resources.  Nonetheless, as we describe in the next
Section, we believe that a structured interrogation of specific exam-
ples of constructed cultural commons is both possible and likely to be
fruitful.
B. Specifying the Framework for Studying Constructed Cultural
Commons
This Section describes in greater detail our proposed framework
for approaching case studies of particular constructed cultural com-
mons, building on the concepts reflected in Figure 2, above, and fo-
cusing on the character of the questions that should guide any specific
investigation.  We begin in Section 1 with some comments on impor-
tant distinctions between our framework and the IAD framework for
natural resource commons, namely that the cultural environment it-
self differs in certain fundamental respects from the natural resource
environment.  In Section 2, we describe how those distinctions drive
the appropriate set of inquiries into basic characteristics of the com-
mons.  This section is the heart of our analysis.  In Section 3, we
briefly discuss how the expansion of the framework affects the analysis
of patterns of interaction and outcomes of the action arenas arising in
culturally constructed commons.
1. The Background Environment: An Initial Conundrum
When seeking to apply the Ostrom approach to constructed cul-
tural commons, we immediately confront a conceptual challenge.  Os-
trom’s inquiry begins by asking questions about the “biophysical
characteristics” of the resources involved in the limited commons in
question.  This inquiry assumes, implicitly, a natural environment con-
taining natural resources that are to be shared and managed.  In
describing a constructed cultural commons, we must take a step back
before describing the relevant characteristics of the shared resources
to ask how we should define the environmental backdrop against
which a commons is constructed.  As is generally true for understand-
ing constructed cultural commons, there may not be one correct an-
swer to this question.  There is no clean way to separate a particular
cultural commons from the “natural” cultural background, because
cultural activity is always grounded in human social interaction, the
material environment, laws, and norms.  Although there may not be
one right answer, it is important to choose a starting point for investi-
gation in a particular case.  Asking the question ensures the salience
of the choice of the background against which further description is
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made.  Importantly, that choice frames the larger environment within
which a particular commons and related institutions and practices are
nested, leading to a better description of the sources and significance
of the social, political, and economic aspects of commons.91
We identify two reasonable points of “natural environment” refer-
ence for the investigation of constructed cultural commons: a “natu-
ral” cultural environment without intellectual property and a “default”
intellectual-property-based cultural environment.  These two starting
points correspond roughly to the public domain and to a propertized
environment, respectively.  Which starting point is most appropriate
to use for a particular inquiry will depend on which most closely ap-
proximates the cultural commons in a particular case.  In a context
such as a patent pool92 or the jamband phenomenon that emerged
around the recorded performances of the Grateful Dead,93 for exam-
ple, describing a constructed cultural commons according to how it
deviates from the default IP regime may be the most useful approach.
In other contexts, such as the shared journalism resource constructed
by the AP,94 describing a cultural commons according to its differ-
ences from a completely open public domain may be the most useful
approach.  In still other contexts, such as the sharing of magic tricks
among the community of magicians,95 secrecy may provide the most
natural backdrop.  Here we comment briefly on the “natural” cultural
environment and on the copyright and patent law default propertized
environments before moving on to suggest additional questions that
should be pursued in analogy to Ostrom’s framework.
a. The “Natural” Cultural Environment
Despite what appears to be the expanding scope of IP law, a sig-
nificant range of activities, practices, and intellectual resources re-
main outside the intended scope of even the most expansive IP
regimes.  When cultural commons are constructed in these arenas,
the most appropriate choice for the “natural environment” is a cul-
tural environment unmediated by rights of exclusion or other regula-
tion.  This “natural” cultural environment may also be the appropriate
starting point for discussing constructed cultural commons in which
IP rights, though available, play a marginal role.
91 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (noting the role of nesting in Os- R
trom’s framework).
92 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. R
93 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. R
94 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. R
95 See Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without
Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123, 135–37 (Christine A. Corcos ed.,
2010).
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The contours of the “natural” cultural environment are not un-
contested.  The major IP regimes exclude many different types of in-
tellectual resources based on many different criteria and doctrines.
Some would describe the complete set of nonenclosed resources as
the public domain, including not only matter excluded on subject-
matter grounds but also matter subject to rights of fair use or fair deal-
ing,96 or as to which IP rights have expired.97  The “natural” environ-
ment then can be seen as a vast pool of cultural resources that are
openly accessible and openly usable by anyone without the permission
of anyone else.98
Julie Cohen has argued that a purely natural resources concep-
tion of the public domain, and one that relies on the distinction be-
tween permitted use and use that does not require a rights owner’s
permission, may lead to a misleading follow-on analysis too closely tied
to geographic concepts—that is, a conception of the public domain as
a separate place.99  Cohen argues persuasively for a more contextual
understanding of the “common in culture,” a cultural landscape that
is informed and shaped by cultural practices.100
Our conception of the “natural” environment relates to Cohen’s
cultural landscape model as it similarly integrates a more dynamic and
contextual understanding of intellectual resources.  We might say that
the “natural” cultural environment encompasses all that we inherit and
experience.  We inherit the natural physical environment—live within,
use, interact with, and change it—and we pass it on to future genera-
tions.  Similarly, we inherit, live within, use, interact with, change, and
pass on an intellectual and cultural environment, which is itself com-
prised of many overlapping sub-environments of science and art,
among other things. Experience constitutes an important intellectual
resource that simultaneously relates human beings to their inherited
and evolving environment(s) and constitutes a resource that may
shape the intellectual environment.  Experience (or perception or ob-
servation) is not enclosed within IP regimes except when expressed
and embodied in a particular qualifying form, such as a copyrightable
work of authorship or a patentable invention.101
96 See Samuelson, supra note 32, at 798. R
97 See id. at 789–90.
98 On different versions of the public domain, see id. at 789–813.
99 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain,
in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW
121, 135–37 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
100 See id. at 157–66.
101 Commenting on an earlier draft of this paper after a presentation, Mario Biagioli
offered a metaphor grounded in the work of Edward Young. See EDWARD YOUNG, CONJEC-
TURES ON ORIGINAL COMPOSITION 9–12 (Scolar Press Ltd. 1966) (1759).  Biagioli suggested
that the cultural environment might be seen as a garden and the processes of inheritance
and experience as cultivation.  Nevertheless, he cautioned against taking the notion of a
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In sum, the natural intellectual environment consists of a vast
pool of open intellectual resources within which and with which we
experience life and engage in a wide variety of activities and practices.
The salience of specific features of a “natural” background will de-
pend on the context of the inquiry.  In many cases, constructed cul-
tural commons arrangements build directly on this nonpropertized
“natural” background.  Examples of constructed cultural commons
for which the “natural” environment is the most appropriate baseline
likely include the commons of scientific research results and tools in
the basic sciences, the facts and related information that are compiled
not only by journalists via the AP but also in online creations such as
Wikipedia, and devices invented by and shared among sports
enthusiasts.102
The “natural” environment may be the most appropriate baseline
for viewing a cultural commons even if intellectual property protec-
tion is available for the resources contributed to the commons, and
even if IP law plays some role in its construction.  For example, the
AP, which was constructed initially as a means of managing the shar-
ing of an intellectual resource (news) that was not protected by the
standard forms of IP law (the First Amendment generally precludes
copyright protection for facts) was the plaintiff in the leading case
that established an intellectual-property-like “hot news” doctrine regu-
lating a very specific type of misappropriation of factual information
important to the AP constructed commons.103  The importance of a
constructed cultural commons analysis is that it recognizes that crea-
tive environments are constructed by deviating from both the purely
“natural” and the purely propertized extremes.  Indeed, once we have
identified the background environment and shared resources of a
particular cultural commons, the bulk of the analysis will focus on the
institutions that are constructed to govern deviations from that back-
ground structure.
b. The Default Proprietary Environments
The two principal regimes of IP law—patent and copyright law—
are the most salient alternatives to the “natural” environmental base-
line described above.
Patent grants are justified generally on the ground that the natu-
ral shareability of technological ideas undermines incentives to pro-
“natural” cultural environment too far.  Our discussion of choosing an appropriate base-
line should make clear that we have heeded his advice.
102 See, e.g., Nikolaus Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activi-
ties: An Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL’Y 157, 169 (2003)
(studying how individuals in a community of sports enthusiasts share information freely).
103 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R
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duce and distribute more and superior forms of innovation.104  This
basic conception highlights an important difference between con-
structed cultural commons and commons in the natural resource con-
text.  Constructed cultural commons must be concerned not only with
managing and sustaining existing resources but also with providing
institutions to encourage the creation of new resources.
Patent rules vary somewhat from country to country, but gener-
ally time-limited patent rights are granted to the developers of an “in-
vention” after an appropriate government agency examines a patent
application.105  The applicant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the patent examiner that the innovation represented by the invention
is new (or “novel,” in the language of patent law) in that no one has
invented the device before; useful; nonobvious (in the language of
American patent law) or possessing an “inventive step” (in most Euro-
pean systems), such that the invention represents a technical advance
over the existing art;106 and adequately described in the application
for the benefit of future adopters and adapters of the technology.107
The holder of a valid patent possesses a statutory right to exclude all
others from producing or selling the invention,108 subject to ex-
tremely limited exceptions for experimentation and research on the
subject matter of the patent.109  Notably, however, patent rights expire
after a relatively short term, typically twenty years.110  The material
covered by the patent then passes into the public domain.  An exam-
ple of a constructed cultural commons for which a patented environ-
ment serves as an appropriate baseline is a patent pool.
Copyright law departs from the “natural environment” norm for
the cultural environment in ways that resemble patent law, and for the
same reasons, but with respect to material forms of artistic and crea-
tive cultural expression rather than technological and technical inno-
vation.  As with patent law, copyright statutes vary in their details from
country to country yet generally embody a set of core principles.111
The author of an “original” or creative work is granted a statutory enti-
tlement to exclude others from reproducing, adapting, performing or
distributing copies of that work to the public.  Unlike patent law, copy-
104 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOG-
ICAL AGE 119 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (explaining incentive justification).
105 For an overview of U.S. patent doctrine, see id. at 124–27.
106 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(1), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M.
270 (as amended by Revision Act of Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.epo.org/pat-
ents/law/legal-texts/epc.html [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (“inventive
step”).
107 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 104, at 124. R
108 See id. at 126.
109 See id. at 321–25.
110 See id. at 126.
111 For an overview of copyright doctrine, see id. at 388–89.
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right generally embeds a broad range of exceptions and exclusions,
including exclusions of subject matter that is functional rather than
expressive (and therefore the subject of patent law) or that is too
broad or abstract to be identified clearly as the specific product of a
specific author.  In the United States, the copyright holder is subject
to a user’s power to engage in “fair use” of copyrighted material.112  In
the Commonwealth countries, a copyright typically is subject to a
somewhat more limited “fair dealing” exception.113  Other countries
specify a range of exceptions, exclusions, and compulsory licenses for
a variety of specific purposes.114  Finally, as with patents, expiration of
the copyright delivers the covered material to the public domain.  In
general the term of copyright lasts far longer than the term of pat-
ent—the life of the author plus fifty years, in most countries, and the
life of the author plus seventy years in the United States and European
Union countries.115  Examples of constructed cultural commons for
which copyright is an appropriate baseline are the General Public Li-
cense (GPL) for open source computer software116 and open access
repositories for academic publishing.117
2. Basic Characteristics of the Constructed Cultural Commons
The next step after choosing an appropriate characterization of
the “natural” environment in which a particular cultural commons re-
sides is to identify basic characteristics relevant to the function of that
commons in producing, managing, and disseminating intellectual
goods.  Here we suggest, as a starting point, a series of nested inquiries
that we hope, when applied to and refined by a series of case studies,
will assist researchers to identify the attributes that define successful
and sustainable cultural-commons regimes and distinguish them from
unsuccessful regimes.
112 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
113 See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 29 (Eng.).
114 See European Patent Convention, supra note 106, art. 52; INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND R
SUSTAINABLE DEV. & U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., EXCEPTIONS TO PATENT RIGHTS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Issue Paper No. 17, at 19–42 (Oct. 2006) (prepared by Christo-
pher Garrison), available at http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11716/ (reviewing exceptions
to patent rights).
115 See Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 J.O. (L 167) (EU); MERGES ET AL., supra note
104, at 388. R
116 For an explanation of the basic principles of the GPL, see Brett Smith, A Quick
Guide to GPLv3, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.
html.  For the terms of the GPL, see Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public Li-
cense (June 29, 2007), http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html.  A preliminary ex-
amination of the open source license as a managed environment appears in Michael J.
Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003).
117 For a discussion of open access publishing in the context of the norms of an aca-
demic community, see Michael J. Madison, The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige,
and Open Access, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 901 (2006) (exploring open access in legal
scholarship).
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By analogy to Ostrom’s inquiries, we propose and discuss in this
Section the following initial inquiries, which we refer to as “baskets” of
research questions:
• particular subject matter, resources pooled and so forth;
• particular activities undertaken and the actors who perform
them;
• goals and objectives of the cultural commons;
• degree of “openness” of the cultural commons; and
• governance or “rules-in-use” of the cultural commons.
These inquiries are related to the Resource Characteristics, Attributes
of Community, and Rules-in-Use section of Figure 2.118
a. Resources and Community
After choosing an appropriate baseline environment, the next
step in investigating a constructed cultural commons is to identify the
set of resources being pooled and the relevant community of actors.
The resources might appear to be obvious, such as patents in a patent
pool, news items for a news service, recordings for a database of mu-
sic, or recipes shared within the community of French chefs.119  Or, it
may take some consideration to identify the most salient description
of the relevant resources.  What resources are pooled and shared in
an open source software community?  Ideas?  Code?  Coding exper-
tise?  Debugging opportunities?  In many contexts, and perhaps even
in patent pools and French cooking, multiple types of resources are
being shared within a community.  The dynamic character of intellec-
tual and knowledge resources means that shared resources may not be
fully independent of one another both in the sense that the value of
one shared resource may depend on its relationship to other shared
resources, and in the sense that any shared resource may arise from or
be developed from a different shared resource.  The multiple contri-
butions to a single open source software project demonstrate both fea-
tures.  The durability of shared resources must be considered.  Patents
and copyrights expire; tangible objects may wear out or be consumed.
Our framework aims to be inclusive and thus aware of the variety of
resources collected in cultural commons.  We avoid a myopic focus on
intellectual property assets.
118 We refer to these as “basic characteristics” rather than Ostrom’s “exogenous vari-
ables” because, as discussed above, here, much more than in the natural resources context,
it is unreasonable to regard important characteristics of the resources themselves as “exog-
enous” to the commons structure. See OSTROM, supra note 54, at 13. R
119 See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas
Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1151–55 (2007);
Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of
French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008).
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Similarly, the identity of community members may be clear—as it
is in a patent pool—or questions may exist about how the community
is constituted.  Does the open source software community consist of
programmers alone?  Does it include users of the code?  People who
submit comments or assist with debugging?  Entrepreneurs who initi-
ate meetings and dialogue or organize the community?  People who
develop, disseminate, and manage the relevant licenses?  Those who
monitor compliance with license terms?  People who develop tools,
host websites, and otherwise support the community?120  Rather than
seeking a single answer, our inquiry leads us to identify each of these
constituencies and describe their specific roles.  Critically, asking who
is part of a particular constructed cultural commons sharpens the in-
quiry and helps pave the way for inquiries into institutions, govern-
ance, and sustainability.
Cultural commons exist on a spectrum.  At one end of this spec-
trum are collective organizations that manage copyrights or patent
pools.  This subset is useful to work with because the set of pooled
resources is easily identifiable, as is the relevant community of actors.
Specifically, the set of resources is comprised of rather discrete,
propertized, intellectual works, such as patented inventions, and the
community is comprised of those who own those works and wish to
reuse them.121  At the other end of the spectrum are more complex
examples.  For example, the sharing and development of ideas, skills,
tacit knowledge, and even the intellectual and cultural components of
social capital within a university research community constitutes a
constructed cultural commons.122  This example invites significant va-
riation among case studies based on the particular resources and sub-
set of the university community targeted for study.  Depending on the
resources under investigation, the relevant community may be de-
fined broadly in terms of the university as an institution, more nar-
rowly in terms of a particular university or academic discipline, or
most narrowly in terms of a specific academic unit, department, or
school.  Even something as seemingly mundane as an academic con-
ference or scholarly presentation or an e-mail listserv among col-
leagues in a specific discipline might be usefully analyzed using our
constructed cultural commons framework.
120 For studies of open source software, see STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN
SOURCE (2004).
121 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
122 See Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Per-
spective: A View from the Demand Side, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 155, 169–73 (Gary D. Libecap
ed., 2005); Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 21, at 378–402. R
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b. Identifying Goals and Objectives
Before describing the “rules-in-use” or governance structure of a
constructed cultural commons, it is important to identify the particu-
lar problem or problems that a given commons is constructed to ad-
dress.  In the natural resource context, this question does not often
come to the fore because common-pool resources are defined by the
problem of subtractability or rivalrousness (e.g., removing lobsters
from the pool results in fewer lobsters for everyone else) and the risk
that a common-pool resource will be exhausted by uncoordinated self-
interested activity (e.g., unmanaged harvesting may jeopardize the sus-
tainability of the lobster population).123
Intellectual commons address different problems, which are de-
fined initially by the fact that, as public goods, intellectual resources
are not rivalrously consumed.124  A copyrighted work or patented in-
vention can be “used” simultaneously by many people while it is part
of a commons without diminishing its availability for others.  For ex-
ample, the news remains available on the AP wire even after a particu-
lar member newspaper publishes an AP-generated story.  The various
problems that cultural commons institutions solve are not merely, or
even primarily, problems of overuse.  The problems addressed by cul-
tural commons include the production of intellectual goods to be
shared, the overcoming of transaction costs leading to bargaining
breakdown among different actors interested in exploiting the intel-
lectual resource, the production of commonly useful platforms for
further creativity, and so forth.125
More generally, we can distinguish among different types of cul-
tural commons based on their core purposes.  Some such commons
arise as solutions to collective action, coordination, or transactions
cost problems that exist apart from IP rights (and perhaps would not
be solvable without these rights).  These solutions might involve in-
stances of cooperative behavior where members construct an open en-
vironment to pool resources and use those resources themselves for
some specific purpose.  Open source software projects, mediated by
formal free and open source licenses and by informal communal
structures for determining what code becomes part of the “author-
ized” code base, are examples of this type.126  Standard-setting enter-
123 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
124 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. R
125 See Merges, supra note 5, at 1295–1301; Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of R
Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1515–19 (2005).
126 See Merges, supra note 21, at 19 (noting that “[i]ndividual contributions [to open R
source software projects] are evaluated and integrated by a central organization or infor-
mal group entrusted with maintaining and authorizing ‘official’ versions of the software”).
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prises also fit into this category,127 as do joint ventures for scientific
research and development.128  These cultural commons depend on
each member’s possessing certain intellectual property interests as a
facilitator of participation.
A second type of commons or pooling arrangement is intended
to solve collective action, coordination, or transactions cost problems
that exist only because of the IP rights themselves.129  In some of these
cases, a commons is constructed as a defense against potential priva-
tization of commonly useful resources.  Examples of such arrange-
ments might include constructed commons for basic biological
building blocks such as the Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP)
consortium130 or the publicly available databases of genomic se-
quences that are part of the Human Genome Project.131  Formal li-
censes and related agreements assure that participants in the
commons become part of what amounts to a mutual nonaggression
pact that is necessary precisely because of the possibility that intellec-
tual resources may be propertized.  So long as the resource is in the
commons, it can be shared among commons members, and neither
commons members nor outsiders are able to appropriate that re-
source, patent it, and then assert a patent claim against a commons
member.  Within the commons, research proceeds more or less as it
otherwise would, according to informal disciplinary norms and free of
(or at least, less burdened by) undue anxiety about propertization and
potential holdup.
A third type of cultural commons may be designed to mediate
among communities with different default norms.  Technology trans-
fer institutions, which enable universities and other nonprofit re-
search enterprises to deliver information resources (such as the
technical knowledge described in patent specifications) to the private
127 See 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 35.4 (Supp. 2009); Merges, supra
note 125, at 1515–16; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 136–42. R
128 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 127, § 36; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUS- R
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 413–14 (1988).
129 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 625  (1998) (noting that “[g]overnments can create
too many property rights and too many decisionmakers who can block use”).
130 See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABO-
RATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 166–69 (2006); Michael Morgan, New Paradigms in Industry:
The Single Nucleotide Polymorphism Consortium, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 194, 194–97
(Julie M. Esanu & Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003).
131 For discussions of “open source” approaches to biology, see, for example, Sapna
Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745
(2007); Arti K. Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005).
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market, are examples of this type of commons.132  The cultural envi-
ronment inside the university is typically characterized by information
sharing not governed by IP rights, even if IP rights are present as mat-
ters of form.133  The environment outside the university is governed
largely by IP rights.  Technology transfer institutions may constitute
an institutional pool or commons that mediates these two regimes.134
Similarly, open source projects have developed “boundary organiza-
tions” to mediate their relations with commercial firms.135
By specifying these distinct types of cultural commons, we are
probably setting up a more sharply delineated field of institutions
than is really obtained in practice.  In any given commons, it may be
the case—and may even likely be the case—that the motivation for
the pool arises from a variety of considerations, that is, some do not
arise from the character of intellectual property interests themselves,
and some do.
Pooling arrangements also may exist for less socially salutary rea-
sons.  Most obvious is the case of members colluding to restrict com-
petition, and it is certainly within the purview of our approach that
commons should be evaluated in part by reference to the possibility of
anticompetitive behavior and other possible costs.  But by requiring as
an initial matter that an intellectual commons operate via sharing of
intellectual resources, we distinguish this project from investigations
of cartels as such, which operate by sharing price and output informa-
tion and which pose significant and obvious risks of anticompetitive
behavior without offsetting welfare benefits.136  The functional pur-
pose of cartels is different from the cultural commons arrangements
noted above; that is, cartels are not designed to create an open envi-
ronment within which resources may be shared and productively used
by members or to sustain individual members.  But just as the line
132 See Patrick L. Jones & Katherine J. Strandburg, Technology Transfer and an Informa-
tion View of Universities: A Conceptual Framework for Academic Freedom, Intellectual Property, Tech-
nology Transfer and the University Mission 13–17 (Feb. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors).
133 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 21, at 378–89; John P. Walsh et R
al., Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Re-
search, 36 RES. POL’Y 1184, 1199–1200 (2007).
134 See Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Start-ups and Spin-offs: Collective En-
trepreneurship Between Invention and Innovation, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
POLICY: GOVERNANCE, START-UPS, AND GROWTH IN THE U.S. KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 61, 79–80
(David M. Hart ed., 2003).
135 See O’Mahony & Bechky, supra note 6; Siobha´n O’Mahony & Fabrizio Ferraro, Man- R
aging the Boundary of an ‘Open’ Project 18 (IESE Bus. Sch., Univ. of Navarra, Working Paper
No. 537, 2004).
136 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 116–32
(4th ed. 2005); Peter Z. Grossman, Introduction: What Do We Mean by Cartel Success?, in HOW
CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION 1, 1–7 (Peter Z.
Grossman ed., 2004).
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between different types of intellectual commons may be difficult to
draw consistently, the line between commons and cartels similarly may
be difficult to draw.  Antitrust regulators have long faced the chal-
lenge of identifying illegitimate cartels disguised as legitimate patent
pools and other knowledge-sharing institutions.137
c. Degrees of Openness and the Character of Control
Commons regimes are defined both by the degree of openness and
control that they exhibit with respect to contributors, users, and re-
sources, and by the assignment of control, or custody of the power to adminis-
ter access. The rules-in-use of a constructed cultural commons will
delineate its degree of openness, particularly with respect to use of the
resources by outsiders who do not contribute to resource creation.
Again, this inquiry is less relevant to natural resource commons ar-
rangements.  Natural resources generally are finite, potentially
rivalrous in consumption, often congested, and subject to tragic over-
consumption.138  Consequently, it is often necessary to limit access to
a common-pool resource to a defined community.  The boundaries of
the community sharing a resource tend to be coextensive with the
boundaries of commons self-governance.139  Thus, in many cases, the
commons is open to members and closed to everyone else, and that is
the end of the story.  Intellectual resources, by contrast, are not sub-
ject to the same natural constraints and are naturally shareable with-
out a risk of congestion or overconsumption.  Rarely does “too much
information” diminish the value of individual items of information.140
137 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 127, §§ 30.4, 34.2. R
138 Complications arise here because of distinctions between “natural resources” like
oil, wood, and other purely rivalrous resources that are necessarily depleted and nonre-
newable, and “natural resources” like forests, lakes, or other common-pool resources that
are not necessarily depleted and are potentially renewable if managed sustainably. See
RUHL ET AL., supra note 48, at 52, 64–65 (describing a “threshold of irreversibility,” noting R
that “once thresholds are crossed, it can take enormous spans of time to rebuild natural
capital through ecological processes,” and describing the risk of congestion); Brett M.
Frischmann, Environmental Infrastructure, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 151, 155, 166–68 (2008) (exam-
ining differences in the degree of rivalrousness for different natural resources and distin-
guishing between rival natural resources like oil and partially (non)rival natural resources
like the atmosphere).
139 See OSTROM, supra note 58, at 61–88 (describing various examples illustrating this R
point).
140 See Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94
GEO. L.J. 1065 (2006) (critiquing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Re-
newable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 484–88 (2003) (suggesting some instances of
congestion)); see also Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the
Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 133, 166–71 (2007) (considering congestion ef-
fects associated with information overload).  Trademark dilution is a controversial area in
which overuse of a particularly famous and distinctive mark arguably leads to congestion-
type effects. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30, at 222–28; Giovanni B. Ramello, What’s in R
a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 547, 555–56 (2006).
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It is entirely possible and desirable for a community to produce and/
or manage a cluster of cultural goods that is accessible to outsiders.141
One of the measures of the social benefit of a constructed cultural
commons may be the degree to which it disseminates the intellectual
goods it produces to a wider audience.
i. Openness as Applied to Resources
What do we mean by openness?  Little ambiguity exists in most
everyday contexts (e.g., an open door), but openness can be a confus-
ing concept when used to describe an intellectual resource.  Open-
ness describes our capacity to relate to a resource by accessing and
using it.  In other words, openness describes the extent to which there
are barriers to possession or use.  Openness varies according to the
costs of surmounting barriers (in terms of money, conditions, or other
restrictions) to exploitation.  Openness in this sense may encompass
joint or shared access to and use of the resource.142
Barriers to possession or use of a resource may be natural or con-
structed.  A resource may be open naturally because its characteristics
prevent it from being possessed, owned, or controlled by anyone.143
Frischmann provides one example:
[F]or most of the earth’s history, the oceans and the atmosphere
were natural commons . . . [b]ecause, for example, exercising do-
minion over such resources was beyond the ability of human beings
or simply was unnecessary because there was no indication of
scarcity.
A resource also may be open . . . as the result of social construc-
tion.  That is, laws or rules may prohibit ownership or ensure [a
certain degree of openness] . . . .144
For example, copyright law grants protection over creative ex-
pression but excludes protection for ideas in order to maintain open
access and use of ideas.  Patent law likewise excludes abstract ideas
from patentability.  Openness may arise through norms and customs
among owners and users and through institutional design.145
141 Frischmann refers to this as “leveraging” the “nonrivalry” of intellectual resources.
Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
801, 810 (2009) (“In the context of intellectual property law, society [encourages participa-
tion in activities that generate spillovers] through a variety of legal arrangements that en-
able sharing and productive use of nonrival resources—in essence, leveraging nonrivalry.”).
142 See Joel West, Seeking Open Infrastructure: Contrasting Open Standards, Open Source and
Open Innovation, 12 FIRST MONDAY (2007), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1913/1795 (discussing the various meanings of “open” in
system-based industries).
143 Frischmann, supra note 49, at 936. R
144 Id. at 936–37 (footnotes omitted).
145 See id.
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Openness and the vesting of control over openness are related.
In part, both concepts may simply reflect choices regarding how best
to manage resources.  In the context of intellectual property pools, for
example, management of the pooled resources may be vested in a
central institution created specifically for that purpose, or it may be
decentralized and vested in the hands of individual IP rights
holders.146
Openness and the sources of control also reflect power and its
distribution among potential possessors and users.  Openness may be
measured by the degree of control over the terms of access and use of
a specific resource.  Such control is exercised by human beings on
human beings.  Openness is relational, and it relies on social
institutions.
In sum, openness is a functional variable that describes the de-
gree to which possession and use of a resource is controlled, and it is a
relational variable that describes the structure of relationships among
potential resource users.
ii. Openness as Applied to a Community
As a resource or set of resources may have an open character, so
may a community.  As openness is applied to resources, openness of a
community is defined partly in functional terms, by natural and con-
structed attributes that define membership in the community, and
partly in terms of power and other bases for relations among partici-
pants.147  Above, we defined the cultural environment as a set of inter-
dependent and interconnected systems and resources.148  As with
openness applied to resources, openness with regard to a community
describes our capacity to relate to that community as a contributor or
user of resources that comprise in part the cultural commons.  Thus,
openness describes the extent to which there are criteria for or barri-
ers to membership or participation in the creative or innovative
processes that the cultural commons is intended to support.  Open-
ness also describes the extent to which a particular community is ac-
cessible to and interconnected with related context, institutions, and
social practices.
Openness with respect to a community has an internal dimension
as well as an external one, as it reflects the degree to which partici-
pants in the cultural commons collaborate with one another or other-
wise share human capital as well as (or rather than) resources.  For
146 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. R
147 Accordingly, we focus much less on whether some social context is or is not a “com-
munity” according to predefined criteria and much more on the functional characteristics
of that context.
148 See supra text accompanying note 48. R
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example, the participants in an intellectual property pool may specify
rules regarding how resources are contributed to and withdrawn from
the pool.  The General Public License for open source computer pro-
grams specifies that membership in the community defined by users
of the program is open to anyone.149  Anyone may add to, use, or
redistribute the licensed program.  Redistributors, however, must
abide by the license term that they make the full source code of the
program accessible to further users of the program.  Moreover, in
most open source software projects, only certain contributions are ac-
cepted into “official” versions of the code.150  Thus, although use and
modification of the code for personal use are open to anyone, the
ability to contribute to the shared resource is regulated.
In describing and assessing the degrees of openness and control
that characterize a cultural commons or pool, one should bear in
mind more than just the conventional producer perspective by which
information and knowledge shareability problems often are analyzed.
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”151 is typically understood as chal-
lenging markets and governments to offer ways to supply resources in
the face of cooperation and competition problems.152 In analyzing
openness with respect to resources and communities, accordingly, it is
tempting to limit the analysis to openness with respect to actual and
potential resource producers.
In information and knowledge environments, those resources are
“naturally” given only in part.  The cumulative and aggregative charac-
ter of knowledge is fundamental to human culture.  Producers of
knowledge and culture resources are therefore simultaneously users
and consumers.  In analyzing openness, it is important to consider the
degree to which openness expresses the interests of users, as matters
of both function and relation.  In particular, a constructed commons
in the cultural environment may function as infrastructure.153  In the
cultural environment, the tragedy of the commons that Hardin de-
scribed may refer not to an undersupply of a resource prompted by
overconsumption but instead to an undersupply prompted by the fail-
ure of the private market to aggregate user or consumer preferences
for certain fundamental or “infrastructural” resources.  This situation
occurs, for example, in the context of basic research conducted within
149 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. R
150 See KELTY, supra note 7, at 27–31 (describing open source software collectives as R
“recursive publics”).
151 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
152 See Elinor Ostrom, Tragedy of the Commons, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), available at http://
www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_T000193.
153 See Frischmann, supra note 49, at 974–78. R
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and across universities.154  To the extent that the Internet itself consti-
tutes a commons, it is likely better characterized as an infrastructural
resource that solves certain problems of consumption rather than
problems of production.
d. Governance or “Rules-in-Use”
Having identified a cultural commons, chosen an appropriate
description of the background environment within which the com-
mons is nested, and assessed the characteristics of associated resources
and populations, goals and objectives, and the degree and character
of openness and control, the next task is to investigate more specifi-
cally the characteristics of the cultural commons that relate to its gov-
ernance and the way it functions.  Here we identify several relevant
clusters or “buckets” of variables that will be important to explore:155
• history and narrative;
• entitlement structures and resource provisions;
• institutional setting (including markets and related firm and col-
lective structures, social structures that describe the roles and in-
terests of individual actors in the commons, and boundary
organizations or mechanisms mediating internal governance of
the commons with external markets, the public domain, and
other institutions);
• legal structures (including intellectual property rules, subsidies,
contract and licensing law, antitrust provisions); and
• governance mechanisms of the commons (membership rules, re-
source contribution or extraction standards and requirements,
conflict resolution mechanisms, sanctions for rule violation).
i. History and Narrative
What is the relevant history and narrative of a given commons?
Above, we noted the importance of language and metaphor in under-
standing the information environment.156  Any given knowledge pool
depends in an important sense on its creation narrative.  That narra-
tive depends in turn on a variety of linguistic and metaphor resources:
the vocabulary and syntax that participants and observers use in
describing the construct are keys to unlocking its origins, its opera-
tion, and even its future.  Carol Rose has written of property as a
154 See Frischmann, supra note 28; Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and R
University Technology Transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93, 97–99 (2005); sources cited supra
note 33; supra note 122 and accompanying text. R
155 The clusters of questions that follow are analogous to Ostrom’s inquiries into the
descriptive characteristics of a commons regime. See Ostrom & Hess, supra note 66. R
156 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. R
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story.157  Michael Madison158 and Jessica Silbey159 have both described
the creation myths that accompany default regimes of intellectual
property.  The very phrase “patent pool,” for example, itself has come
to signify a specific set of legal expectations and criticisms.  If one says
“patent pool,” an informed commentator thinks immediately of (i) a
self-governing arrangement and (ii) antitrust considerations, rather
than intellectual property problems and solutions.  (In part, we aim to
realign that point of view.)  Calling something a “knowledge com-
mons,” or recharacterizing certain patent pools as solutions to “an-
ticommons” problems, triggers a different set of expectations.  The
rhetorical frame shifts primarily to dynamic problems in information
and information property, rather than to largely static output con-
cerns.  A commons is a rhetorically open place.  A “pool” emphasizes
the resources themselves and how those resources are bounded.
Explicitly giving attention to creation narratives also encourages
attention to evolutionary processes.  Changes in the narrative over
time, or conflicts embedded within a narrative, can illustrate debates
over purpose, which can illuminate the normative foundations of
commons and highlight points of conflict.  Looking at history can
help answer the question of how the commons changes and adapts
over time, in light of changes in firm structure, market structure, and
resources (such as emergent legal structures, background legal enti-
tlements, and temporal features like limitations on duration) that are
built into those entitlements.  History and narrative also emphasize
the importance of contextual details that are ignored or marginalized
in an overly rationalist account of institutional design.  For example,
within this cluster, we would like to uncover details concerning the
influence of power, politics, and personalities that are often necessary
to understanding commons.  This cluster of questions provides an im-
portant link back to the earlier discussion of community and
objectives.160
ii. Entitlement Structures and Resource Provisions
In any resource pool, the resources that are part of the commons
have to come from somewhere.  This cluster is intended to capture an
array of questions concerning the boundaries around the resources
themselves and how those boundaries are socially constructed.  Thus,
157 See CAROL M. ROSE, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 25, 25–45 (1994).
158 See Michael J. Madison, Comment: Where Does Creativity Come from? and Other Stories of
Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (2003).
159 See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 319 (2008).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 119–23. R
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moving beyond, or at least complicating, the initial set of questions
concerning what resources are contributed and subject to the com-
mons arrangement, we would like to better understand how the re-
sources are delineated and how they are contributed and made part of
the commons.
The “natural” information environment contains an abundance
of raw information resources, including inherited and experienced
knowledge.  Those resources often become information “works” and,
therefore, resources in the pool via some cultural construct, such as
the default copyright or patent law systems, via some other institution,
such as a publishing industry producing books, films, or songs, or via
some combination of these and other things, such as cultural practices
or norms.  Understanding the construction of cultural commons
therefore requires understanding the mechanisms by which resources
are provisioned to the commons, whether via legal entitlements or
otherwise, and the nature of entitlements to use and consume those
resources while they are part of that commons.  A patent pool offers
an obvious example.  The patents themselves are resources con-
structed via rights of exclusion offered by patent law.  As pool mem-
bers develop follow-on inventions based on the pooled resources, the
agreement by which the pool is constituted may obligate members to
contribute patents covering those inventions to the pool.161
As with some natural resource pools that (when suitably man-
aged) are self-sustaining and thus supply their own resources, in the
cultural context the commons resources themselves may be sources of
additional resources.  The follow-on invention is an obvious example.
An essential attribute of the governance of a cultural commons, there-
fore, is the way in which it allocates resources as they are produced
dynamically.
Boundaries in an information environment are likewise more ob-
viously culturally constructed than their counterparts in the field of
natural resources.  Oceans, lakes, and rivers have beds and shores; for-
ests yield to fields.  Boundary maintenance is an important part of
commons management in natural resources, but the maintenance
question often has a reference point in naturally occurring bounda-
ries.  In the information environment, all boundaries ultimately de-
pend on cultural constructs.162  Accordingly, this cluster is intended to
help flesh out the connections between the construction of both re-
sources and commons governance systems and the situatedness (or
161 Such grantbacks may raise antitrust concerns. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.6
(1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
162 For a study of boundary maintenance in the open source software context, see
O’Mahony & Bechky, supra note 6, at 431–50. R
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nestedness) of both resources and commons in broader systems.  The
cluster provides an important link back to the earlier discussion of
baselines and degrees of openness.163
iii. Institutional Setting
Pools and commons in the cultural environment are functional
entities; they often serve markets, industries, and firms.  It is impor-
tant to understand the identities and roles of those institutions and
how their own functions relate to the pool and its members.  What are
those markets, and how do they relate to the pool?  The MAA, an
example of an early, well-known patent pool, was organized in large
part to facilitate the production of aircraft for military use during
World War I.164
The institutional and social setting of a cultural commons may
include related collectivist enterprises.  Members of a pool may be
part of a network structure that extends to related collectives, firms,
individuals, groups, and social structures, including disciplines and so-
cial norms.165  Research scientists may be organized formally into
pools or commons structures within firms and other formal institu-
tions, such as universities.  Their functional network will include both
members of their own technical art and related arts and other re-
searchers in different arts who share a related but distinct set of social
norms related to sharing of information and knowledge.  Networks in
not-for-profit or educational research settings will overlap to a degree
with related networks in commercial environments.  Researchers in
university science departments will be interested in sharing informa-
tion resources with researchers in corporate research-and-develop-
ment groups.166  Pools may bridge gaps created by the edges of formal
institutional structures.167
Constructed cultural commons are often situated in nonhier-
archical and distributed institutional settings, in which participants
are only loosely connected and sometimes are connected only by their
163 See supra text accompanying notes 138–41. R
164 See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. R
165 See Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an
Application to the “Patent Explosion”, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1301 (2006).
166 See Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between
Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009) (discussing the sharing of
research tools and materials between researchers in academic and industrial settings);
Norms and the Sharing of Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds.) (forthcoming
2010).
167 Cf. Frischmann, supra note 28; Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 R
FORDHAM L. REV. 2225 (2009) (examining the role of patents as an “interface” between
universities and industry).
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participation in a particular project.168  The range of institutional set-
tings likely to be observed in case studies of cultural commons is thus
likely to be considerably broader than the range observed in natural
resource commons.  The institutional setting will, of course, constrain
and determine the ways in which rules for production and sharing of
resources are both put into place and applied.
iv. Legal Structures that Affect the Pool Itself
Although industry, market, and networked institutional struc-
tures are essential reference points for many knowledge commons,
positive law and direct government involvement with a particular cul-
tural commons are likewise keys to understanding it.  We distinguish
between law that creates and enforces the entitlements that create and
sustain information works, on the one hand, and law that is specifi-
cally addressed to cultural commons themselves, on the other hand.
Here, legislators and judges often find that law can reinforce and sus-
tain a pool that is determined to be welfare-enhancing.  An exemp-
tion or more deferential treatment from antitrust scrutiny for parties
engaged in a form of concerted activity, or intended to engage in con-
certed activity, may be adopted.169  Market conditions or technologies
may develop to the point where observers recognize that some kind of
information collective would be useful, but fear of prosecution under
antitrust law or relevant IP law may be a barrier to the emergence of
the pool.  A safe harbor of a sort may emerge, either via legislation or
judicial decision.  The 1984 judgment of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,170
upholding the legality of distributing videotape recorders over the ob-
jection that they facilitated copyright infringement, may be character-
ized as creating a form of judicial safe harbor for innovative
technologies for reproducing and distributing copyrighted works.
Legal rules may create subsidies or safe harbors in ways other
than relieving at-risk parties from potential liability.  For example, in-
come-tax regimes may permit (or limit) the deductibility of research
expenses by firms, nonprofit enterprises, and/or research collectives.
In the United States patent statute, the section that bars patenting
inventions that are “obvious” in light of prior art in the relevant tech-
nical field includes a subsection that suspends the rule if the inventor
and the producer of the relevant prior art are part of a common “joint
research agreement.”171  Laws designed for one purpose may contrib-
168 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 35, at 59–90 (providing various examples of “com- R
mons-based peer production”).
169 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 127, § 36 (discussing research joint ventures). R
170 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
171 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2) (2006).
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ute differently to promoting collaborations or collectives in ways not
intended by the drafters of the law.  Such a rule becomes part of the
constitution of a commons, even if it was not designed to do so in the
first place.  Jessica Litman uses this proposition to analyze the persis-
tence of a legal regime subsidizing jukeboxes in American copyright
law.172  A compulsory license permitting owners of coin-operated re-
cord players to use copyrighted American music was initially incorpo-
rated into the copyright statute to prevent holders of those copyrights
from monopolizing adjacent markets for performances.173  Over time,
the rationale for the subsidy became less significant, but the statute
was retained because a new collective emerged to support its contin-
ued existence—companies that manufactured and distributed
jukeboxes.
v. Governance Mechanisms
A constructed commons is an alternative to proprietary exclusion
and to direct government intervention as a means of addressing mar-
ket failures associated with public goods, externalities, and the tragedy
of the commons.  Accordingly, understanding the mechanism of gov-
ernance of a particular commons, in the context of its legal and insti-
tutional setting, is at the heart of the analysis.  In Ostrom’s work, the
degree of self-governance is an important characteristic of a resource
pool.174  Members have rights not only to contribute to and extract
from the pool but also to govern themselves by adopting and modify-
ing the relevant rules of participation.
The attributes to be considered here overlap to some extent with
those addressed in the context of determining the scope of the open-
ness of the pool.  The focus shifts, however, from access to the re-
sources of the commons to participation in decision making about
how the resources will be produced and managed.  Who is a member,
and who decides who may be a member?  How is resource contribu-
tion and extraction monitored and, if necessary, limited?  What sanc-
tions and dispute resolution mechanisms are provided for
misconduct?  To what extent do these self-governance mechanisms
rely on or incorporate formal legal mechanisms, and to what extent
do they rely on or incorporate other, nonlegal institutions or social
structures?
For example, in the context of the General Public License for
open source computer programs, membership in the commons de-
fined in part by the license is further defined by use of the program
itself, which, according to the terms of the license that accompanies
172 See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 351–53 (2002).
173 See id. at 352–53.
174 See OSTROM, supra note 58, at 29–55. R
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the programs, constitutes assent to its terms.175  Violation of those
terms, such as onward distribution of a copy of a program without
including a copy of the program’s source code, constitutes a license
violation and automatically terminates that membership.176  Actual
enforcement of that regime, however, typically is not pursued by indi-
vidual contributors to the open source commons but instead by an
independent entity, the Free Software Foundation, which operates as
a freestanding nonprofit organization dedicated to advocacy on be-
half of “free” software and accompanying open source license
terms.177
Research on natural resource pools emphasizes that effective self-
governance typically requires formal access to public sanctioning
and/or enforcement mechanisms.  Without the threat of seizure or
attachment or injunction, community-based or purely norm-based
mechanisms may lack sufficient bite to sustain the pool.  In the con-
text of cultural commons, effective connections between self-gov-
erning collectives and formal sanctioning authorities have not yet
been identified.  In the open source computer software area, only re-
cently have courts begun to consider the enforceability of the li-
censes.178  Conflict resolution mechanisms within a pool depend on
monitoring mechanisms.  Before the emergence of the Internet, re-
search on self-governing communities emphasized size and distance as
key variables in a monitoring system.  As Benkler179 and Cohen180
each argue, networking technology offers not only the potential for
community development and resource aggregation but also the po-
tential for monitoring and enforcement.  Examination of a pool
should include assessment of whether and how it is embedded in net-
work technologies that perform some or all of the pool’s governance
functions.
3. Patterns and Outcomes Emanating from a Particular Action
Arena
Finally, as when analyzing natural resource commons, the analysis
should include an inquiry into patterns of interactions and outcomes,
including:
175 See Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License, supra note 116, § 9. R
176 See id. § 8.
177 See Free Software Foundation, What Is Free Software and Why Is It So Important
for Society?, http://www.fsf.org/about/what-is-free-software (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
178 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  In Jacobsen,
the open source collective was represented by one of its members, Jacobsen, as assignee of
copyright interests in the open source program at issue. See id. at 1375–76.
179 See Benkler, supra note 35, at 2–7, 29–127. R
180 See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 37–43
(2006).
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• solutions to the underlying collective action problem and benefits
delivered by the commons (including innovations and creative
output, and production, sharing, and dissemination of those in-
novations and output to a broader audience), along with the dy-
namics of the social practices that emerge from the interaction of
commons resources and commons participants; and
• costs and risks associated with the commons, including, for exam-
ple, any negative externalities.
A cultural commons should be assessed not only in light of its
ostensible purposes but also in light of its consequences.  This aspect
of the case study approach should both identify the consequences and
describe relevant criteria for evaluating them.
The consequences themselves typically will take at least two
forms, which in a particular case often will be inextricably linked.
With respect to intellectual resources, a cultural commons usually will
produce some intellectual or knowledge-related (or material) output.
The MAA enabled the production of airplanes.  The Linux open
source project supports the Linux computer program.  Wikipedia pro-
duces Wikipedia.org.  The AP enables the production of newspapers.
In the case of most cultural-commons examples, moreover, the
social patterns that emerge from the construction and governance of
the commons may themselves constitute ongoing, constantly re-
freshed commons outcomes.  Many of the companies that were parties
to the original MAA agreement combined via merger and acquisition
by 1929 to form the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, which is still a signifi-
cant defense contractor today.181  The Linux project and Wikipedia
are notable not only for the production of complex industrial-scale
products but also for the governance of networks of loosely aligned
contributors, distributed broadly in space and time.182  The AP and
other wire services have cultivated and retained identities as distinct
and productive enterprises in their own right despite the fact that
much of what they publish is created by their members.183  The jam-
band community is a recognized community that defines itself partly
via its practices of archiving and sharing jamband performances.184
a. Solutions and Benefits
We defined constructed commons in the cultural environment as
solutions to collective action or other transactions cost problems not
arising from the character of intellectual property entitlements them-
181 See DONALD M. PATTILLO, PUSHING THE ENVELOPE: THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT INDUS-
TRY 35, 80–81 (1998).
182 See Benkler, supra note 35, at 65–74. R
183 An adjunct AP product, the Associated Press Stylebook, is published by the AP itself
and is something of a bible for newspaper editors across the industry.
184 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. R
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selves, as solutions to problems that do arise from those entitlements,
as solutions to boundary-spanning dilemmas, and as reactions to an
“infrastructure”-type problem—the market’s inability to aggregate in-
dividual demand for standards or platform resources—that is the in-
verse of the standard tragedy-of-the-commons diagnosis.
For any specific cultural commons, the questions involve not only
the type of problem that it appears to be designed to solve and pre-
cisely how the combination of legal rules and other “openness” con-
structions propose to solve it, but also the success of the commons in
sustaining and generating spillovers and a dynamic cultural environ-
ment.  Quantifying or otherwise documenting that success is particu-
larly difficult in the cultural environment, because the desired
benefits often accrue to populations other than those in direct pro-
ducer/consumer relationships.  Commons can enable spillovers,185
the dynamic benefits that an information environment can be de-
signed to enable whether in its “natural” state, via the “default” varia-
tions on that state as described earlier,186 or via some pool or other
constructed environment.  One beneficiary of the MAA patent pool
was the American government, which purchased aircraft during
World War I.187  The beneficiaries of an online jamband archive may
include ordinary music lovers, who are able to listen to jamband re-
cordings even though they may not count themselves among the jam-
band community itself.188  Under some circumstances, the very
persistence of an institution may be evidence of the success of a com-
mons regime.189
b. Costs and Risks Associated with a Cultural Commons
Any cultural commons may engender a tradeoff between the ben-
efits anticipated from the commons in terms of dynamic welfare en-
hancements and the costs and risks associated with that commons.  In
conventional law-and-economics terms, these costs and risks are fairly
well understood (and, importantly, they are generally better under-
stood and easier to describe and quantify in many instances than the
downstream benefits that commons may supply).  Enabling collabora-
tion and cooperation among firms sharing access to pooled informa-
tion resources facilitates cooperation along lines that may be
anticompetitive and therefore socially harmful: agreements to raise
185 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 27, at 258. R
186 See supra Part II.B.1.
187 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. R
188 See Schultz, supra note 17, at 676–77 (describing the free distribution of jamband R
music).
189 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the success of the commons R
that developed around the Maine lobster industry).
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and fix costs and agreements to reduce output.190  Pools, like other
collective arrangements, also involve administrative costs associated
with constructing, monitoring, and enforcing compliance with the
rules of the pool.  From a welfare standpoint, the level of those costs
must be compared to the level of administrative costs associated with a
system that provisions information resources in the absence of the
pool.
In sum, we offer the framework described in this Part as a tem-
plate for ongoing case study investigations of constructed cultural
commons across a broad variety of domains.  In many contexts, the
existing scholarly literature has undertaken case study investigations
of phenomena grounded in social norms,191 transactions cost eco-
nomics,192 and even history and anthropology,193 all of which may be
profitably aggregated and recast as examples of cultural commons.
One step in that direction is an application of the framework to ana-
lyze universities as cultural commons.194  Collecting and reconstruct-
ing this literature using the clusters of questions listed above will, in
our estimation, yield new insights into the emergence and effective
functioning of cultural commons.
Going forward, we anticipate developing an inventory of new
commons case studies, perhaps beginning with more detailed investi-
gations of some of the examples discussed in the Introduction.  We
also hope other scholars will consider using this framework as part of
their own work.  Over time, we anticipate that the results of further
case studies will yield not only better information regarding commons
themselves but also refinements to the constructed cultural commons
framework and to the above baskets of questions.  In a real sense, the
study of commons is itself a constructed cultural commons, and our
own three-part collaboration is a nested commons within the scholarly
community that studies commons.
CONCLUSION
The theoretical discussion of intellectual property policy has
been myopically focused on extremes of exclusion and open access,
ignoring a wide range of cultural commons that persist between the
extremes.  It is often divorced from empirical studies of creative and
inventive communities.  To the extent that case studies are under-
taken, they tend to be done in isolated areas (such as open source
software or academic publishing) and consider a limited number of
190 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 127, § 34.2. R
191 See Schultz, supra note 17. R
192 See Merges, supra note 5. R
193 See KELTY, supra note 7. R
194 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 21. R
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descriptive variables.  This narrow focus makes integration and learn-
ing from a body of case studies quite difficult, which in turn discour-
ages people from pursuing further case studies.  Scholars appear to be
aware of the need for a more nuanced and structured approach to
these questions but have not yet developed a framework for studying
them.
This Article offers precisely such a framework.  Applying the envi-
ronmental metaphor that is increasingly common in studies of infor-
mation and intellectual property policy, we analogize information and
knowledge resources in the cultural environment to physical re-
sources in the natural environment.  We identify a set of constructed
cultural commons, or pools of information resources, that serve func-
tions in the cultural environment similar to the functions provided by
common-pool resources in the natural environment.  Those functions
consist largely of serving as alternatives to purely private rights of ex-
clusion and to government intervention in solving underproduction
and overconsumption problems associated with an unmanaged or
“natural” resource.  Although constructed commons in the cultural
environment exist for a variety of purposes, in general we hypothesize
that they are often welfare-enhancing in regard to promoting valuable
spillovers of information and knowledge distribution.
Borrowing from Ostrom, we argue that understanding the origins
and operation of beneficial cultural commons requires detailed assess-
ments that recognize that they operate simultaneously at several
levels, each nested in a level above, and that each level entails a variety
of possible attributes that cannot, at this stage of the inquiry, be speci-
fied in detail in advance.  We suggest a set of buckets or clusters of
issues that should guide further inquiry, including the ways in which
information resources and resource commons are structured by de-
fault rules of exclusion, and the ways in which members of these pools
manage participation in the collection, production, preservation, and
extraction of information resources.  Case studies across disciplines
and reviews of existing literature that addresses cultural commons will
help specify relevant attributes within each cluster.  These variables
will help scholars and eventually policymakers assess the level of open-
ness associated with a given commons and determine the extent to
which “openness” is, as we hypothesize, associated with pools that are
welfare-enhancing.
Beyond our proposal of a framework for studying them, our con-
sideration of constructed cultural commons has highlighted a number
of points that are important in the study of intellectual property going
forward.  Considering constructed cultural commons helps to elevate
collective, intermediate solutions to their possible place of signifi-
cance in accounts of property regimes and should diminish the skepti-
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cism of many scholars that collective, norm-driven solutions can work
beyond narrowly defined situations.  Case studies will also call our at-
tention to the constructed, designed character of both the cultural
and the legal environment in regard to knowledge and information
policy problems.  Finally, as they have done in the study of natural
resource management, systematic analyses of cultural commons across
a wide range of collected case studies should lead us to doubt panacea
prescriptions drawn from overly simplistic models.
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